1 - The Black Vault

PROJECT HONEY BADGER AND CREDIBLE SPORT
Capabilities Review, was published on 11 May
1981 and contained pertinent information on
more than 200 initiatives resulting from the
Honey Badger program. 31
At the 1st SOW, the wing established an organization
known as the Special Operations Mission
Planning Division under the director of operations
(1st SOW/DOS). The new division was established
as the “sole coordinating and planning agency for
the wing’s special tasking.” Headquarters TAC provided
11 manpower authorizations for the division,
and personnel already assigned to the wing, including
Combat Talon planners who had participated in
the Desert One mission, filled them. The Mission
Planning Division served as the wing focal point
and communications channel for interface with the
new command at Fort Bragg and for coordinating
with other Air Force, Army, and Navy special op -
erations units. The division provided personnel for
concept planning, exercise training, and contingency
operations. The division also provided the nucleus
of an organization to manage “intense levels of
activity when directed by the 1st SOW Wing Com -
mander.” When operating in that capacity, the
chief, special mission planning staff, became the 1st
SOW chief of staff for special operations. 32 The division
matured into a highly effective organization
that provided excellent support for the wing’s special
tasking, and it continued as an integral part of
the wing from that point forward.
The new joint command assumed mission responsibility
from JTF 1-79 on 22 December 1980,
and on that date Vaught’s JTF was officially deactivated.
For the next 45 days, select elements of
JTF 1-79 remained in the Pentagon and served as
liaisons during the critical transition of the new
administration. At 12:03 P.M. on 20 January 1981,
as President Ronald Reagan was being administered
his presidential oath, two Algerian transports
carrying the American hostages were
cleared for takeoff from Tehran. A few minutes
later they were airborne and headed out of the
country to freedom. 33 After 444 days of captivity,
the hostages were finally free. There would not be
a second rescue attempt.
Fallout in the Pacific over Desert One
The 1st SOS had moved from Nha Trang AB,
Vietnam, to Kadena AB, Okinawa, in the spring
of 1972. The island location did not offer adequate
training facilities for Combat Talon crews. Being
a relatively small island, insufficient space was
available for aircrews to train in their challenging
low-level terrain-following mission. The unit was
placed at Kadena AB because the facilities there
were among the best in the Pacific and because the
location offered a central point in WestPac from
which the squadron could support contingency op -
erations. Training initiatives to gain permission for
the squadron to fly low level in Korea, Taiwan, and
the Philippines were begun when the squadron arrived
at Kadena AB. All three countries were located
within two to three hours from Okinawa and
offered the potential for outstanding training. The
unit had flown in the Philippines when it was located
in Vietnam. After relocation to Kadena AB in
1972, at least one of these three areas was maintained
for low-level training, thus enabling assigned
aircrews to maintain proficiency. A fourth major
training area available to the squadron was Alaska,
but it was eight hours to the north and required
either a tanker or a fuel stop along the way. Although
regular Alaskan deployments were accom -
plished, each required a significant commitment by
the squadron in both time away from home station
(usually a minimum of a week for each deployment)
and in personnel to support the aircraft. Squadron
leadership had long determined that the relatively
unrestricted training environment found in the
Philippines was ideal for squadron training.
The Japanese government, and particularly the
Okinawans, were never keen on basing a special
operations unit on their soil but had little inclination
to block the move in 1972. By 1980, however,
opposition to basing large numbers of American
troops on Okinawa had grown to a point that there
were occasional demonstrations and protests demanding
the removal of at least some of the US
forces. When the Iranian rescue mission failed, little
publicity regarding the extent of 1st SOS participation
surfaced, but it was generally thought by the
Japanese that the squadron had played a role. The
Okinawans who opposed American basing there
seized upon the rescue and labeled it an act of aggression
toward another sovereign nation initiated
from Japanese soil. By the summer of 1980, it was
clear to military leaders that moving the squadron
was in the best interest of both the unit and the
Okinawans. Consequently, on 12 August 1980, the
Air Staff directed that the 1st SOS initiate action to
relocate its aircraft, personnel, and associated
equipment from Kadena AB, Japan, to Clark AB,
Philippines, with the transfer to be completed during
the second quarter of FY 81. All actions necessary
to effect the move were published in Program
Action Directive 80-8, with the move to be com -
pleted by 15 January 1981. Turczynski and his
aircrews continued to be heavily committed to
247