1 - The Black Vault

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP
Orrell had deployed forward to Al Jouf with an
ADVON team to make final preparations for the
anticipated move. From 12 to 14 January, both
rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft prepared to depart
KFIA and move forward. On 14 January eight
MH-53s and four MH-60s, along with two HC-
130s, made the six-hour flight to Al Jouf and
closed at the FOL. The four Combat Talons remained
at KFIA, flew PSYOPS leaflet missions,
and pulled ground alert for CSAR. Just before the
start of the air war, Combat Talons not tasked to
fly leaflet missions were dispersed to Thumrait
AB, Oman, to reduce their vulnerability to attack
by Iraqi missiles at KFIA. AFSOC-assigned units
dropped more than 18 million leaflets during the
course of the campaign.
Initial AFSOCCENT CSAR Tasking
At 0800 on 16 January 1991, the UN deadline
for the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait
passed without any movement by Saddam
Hussein’s forces. Colonel Gray, the AFSOCCENT
commander, received word shortly afterwards
that H hour had been established by General
Schwarzkopf as 0300 on 17 January. At 1400
Gray called Al Jouf to speak to Orrell, who was
the FOL commander there. The H-hour time was
relayed, and Orrell was advised to prepare his
forces for the initial mission of the war. During
the 1930 local changeover briefing at KFIA, Gray
gave the order for all personnel to begin taking
their P pills (medication designed to lessen the
effects of chemical agents) should the base come
under chemical attack by the Iraqis. 53
At Al Jouf, Orrell and Comer established a mission
briefing time of 2230 local and a takeoff time
of 0100 local to meet a TOT of 0238. The TOT was
established 22 minutes before H hour so that the
assigned radar targets could be destroyed before
the launch of the initial wave of Coalition aircraft
into Iraq. Four MH-53H Pave Lows of the 20th
SOS were to lead a formation of eight USA
Apache helicopters into Iraq to destroy Sovietbuilt
early warning radars that could detect the
approach of Coalition aircraft. The radar systems
included the Spoon Rest mobile early warning radar,
the Flat Face early warning and target acquisition
radar, and the Squat Eye search and target
acquisition radar. 54
At the 2130 briefing the combined Pave Low/
Apache team reviewed the mission and the sequence
of events for each aircraft. The formation
was identified as Task Force Normandy and was
charged with creating a break in radar coverage
along the southern Iraqi border. At 0212 local
Task Force Normandy crossed the border into
Iraq after an on-time takeoff. There were two primary
targets, each consisting of early warning radar
vans and communications equipment, which
tied the sites into the overall Iraqi defense network.
Two Pave Lows led each formation through
southern Iraq, flying at a maximum altitude of 50
feet and maneuvering around numerous Bedouin
camps to avoid detection. At precisely 0238 the
Apaches struck the two targets, destroying them
with their AGM-114 Hellfire laser-guided missiles
and Hydra 70 rockets. Minutes later hundreds of
Coalition aircraft penetrated Iraqi airspace undetected
through the gap created by the attack and
dropped thousands of bombs on Bagdad before the
Iraqis could react. 55
Two of the Pave Low helicopters returned to
Arar and maintained CSAR alert during the remainder
of the first night’s air strikes. Although
planners estimated a 2 percent loss rate, only one
British aircraft was lost during the first 24 hours
of the war. The other two helicopters refueled
from HC-130 tankers of the 9th SOS and returned
to Al Jouf. As the Coalition aircraft recovered to
their launch bases, the 8th SOS flew its first leaflet
mission of Desert Storm, dropping two million
leaflets on Iraqi troops positioned in southern Kuwait.
The leaflets became known as the original
surrender card, encouraging the Iraqis to put
down their arms and surrender to Coalition
forces. Many of those leaflets were found on Iraqi
soldiers when they surrendered a month later at
the end of the ground war.
In the weeks that followed, AFSOCCENT continued
to provide a CSAR alert force forward deployed
to Al Jouf, with helicopters shuttled to
Arar and Rafhá each night to sit ground alert. On
19 January AFSOCCENT responded to its first
CSAR call by launching two MH-53H Pave Lows
out of Rafhá into an area just west of Talil Airfield
in central Iraq. After 30 minutes of searching,
the F-16 pilot could not be located, and the
CSAR force had to return to Rafhá empty-handed.
On the following day, a second daylight CSAR
was attempted that included an A-10 escort package
and F-15 fighter coverage. Upon arrival at the
downed pilot’s location, no radio contact could be
established. After 30 minutes of searching in the
area, the two Pave Lows returned to Al Jouf. 56
Although extremely disappointing to the AF -
SOCCENT crews, the initial two unsuccessful recoveries
did not dampen the enthusiasm for the
CSAR mission. On 21 January the first successful
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