1 - The Black Vault

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP
The planned run-in heading was 090 degrees,
which was oriented down the center of the 9,000-
foot-long runway. If the airland option was not
feasible, an airdrop would be made. The standard
drop altitude of 1,000 feet above the ground was
planned, with an altitude as low as 500 feet possible,
dependent on the threat. Planners felt that
the major hazard facing the paratroopers in the
event of an airdrop was the water on either side of
the runway. Each crew was briefed to be over the
airfield before releasing jumpers. A drop into the
rough seas off either side of the runway would be
fatal to the heavily armed rangers. H-hour assault
operations had been slipped from 0400 to
0500 so that the CCT would have time to reconnoiter
the airfield. The new time coincided with
the Marine assault on Pearls. 123
Six hours before the scheduled landings at Grenada,
Tindall departed Hunter AAF with Bach
close behind. The two Combat Talons (call signs
Foxtrot 33 and Foxtrot 34) made up the first
wave, first element, and were to proceed to their
initial point west of Grenada. Bach would close to
30 seconds in trail behind Tindall. Thirty minutes
after the first two Combat Talons were airborne,
Hobson (Foxtrot 35) departed Hunter AAF with
four SOLL C-130s. The five-ship formation made
up the first wave, second element, and was to
proceed to a holding point 70 miles to the west of
Grenada. Seven minutes after Hobson’s departure,
Dave Miles (Foxtrot 40) was airborne, with Skip
Davenport (Foxtrot 41) and three additional
SOLL C-130s making up the third wave. 124 With
the assault force airborne and unknown to the
flight crews, the US State Department contacted
Havana and advised Cuba that a strike was imminent,
assuring Castro that it was not aimed at
his Cuban workers in Grenada. The tip-off invariably
gave the defenders at Point Salines knowledge
of the assault and allowed them time to prepare
their defenses to repel the force. 125
As the formations neared the objective area,
weather in the southern Caribbean steadily deteriorated.
Due to extreme sea states, the CCT was
unable to get ashore at Point Salines to determine
the runway status. At 0400 an AC-130H gunship
was directed by the air mission commander
aboard the ABCCC EC-130 to make a reconnaissance
flight over Point Salines. The gunship determined
that the runway was blocked by heavy
construction equipment and barricades but could
not determine if any antiaircraft defenses were in
place around the airfield. Thirty minutes before
his scheduled TOT, Tindall was notified to scrub
his airland option and plan for an airdrop of
his rangers. Loadmasters on the Combat Talons
and the SOLL II aircraft reconfigured for an airdrop,
while the rangers hastily rigged their parachutes
and prepared for the jump. Having to
dodge thunderstorms and work their way through
rain showers, Tindall’s two-ship formation was on
time as it approached the IP. Twenty miles west
of Grenada, at 500 feet above the water and in the
clouds, Tindall’s LN-15J inertial navigation system
malfunctioned along with his AN/APQ-
122(V)8 radar. In total darkness and in the
weather, Tindall had no choice but to abort his
run in. The air mission commander notified Tindall
to hold in place and directed Bach to join
behind Hobson’s aircraft 30 seconds in trail. With
Hobson 30 minutes behind Tindall, the new TOT
was slipped to 0530. 126 With MARG 1-84’s assault
on Pearls still set for 0500, there would be no
possibility of a surprise attack by the special operations
force.
Bach successfully maneuvered his aircraft and
joined Hobson’s formation as directed. The new
landing sequence had Hobson as the lead aircraft,
Bach 30 seconds in trail behind him, and four
SOLL C-130s behind Bach. The original landing
sequence had combat troops aboard the first two
Combat Talons. Hobson’s load consisted of the
ranger command and control element, but he had
no assault troops. With weather still threatening
and dawn approaching, there was not sufficient
time to resequence the formation. Bach was 30
seconds behind Hobson, and his assault troops
would be on the ground only seconds after the
command element. The ground mission commander
made the decision to continue the approach
in the new sequence. With the antiaircraft
threat unknown and with the threat of ground
fire to his troops, Lt Col Wesley B. Taylor,
USA—commanding the 1st Ranger Battalion and
onboard Hobson’s aircraft—decided to jump at
500 feet above the ground instead of the standard
1,000 feet. The lower altitude would protect
the aircraft better from AAA, and the rangers
would reduce their time of descent and their
vulnerability to ground fire. The Talon crews
wore NVGs to assist them during the drop. Approximately
six miles out from Point Salines,
Hobson’s crew picked up the outline of the airfield,
but shortly afterwards a bright spotlight
illuminated the aircraft and washed out the
crew’s NVGs. As the aircraft passed the coastline,
it slowed to 125 KIAS and opened the
ramp and door. At green light time (0536 local),
282