1 - The Black Vault

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP
1968: The Establishment
of Detachment 2,
1st Special Operations Wing
On 29 December 1967 the SEA Combat Spear
unit lost Crew S-01 and Combat Talon 64-0547
over North Vietnam. This was the second of the
original 14 aircraft to be lost. As a result the
heavy student load already placed on the 779th to
train Combat Arrow aircrews for Europe was increased
so that a replacement crew for the Pacific
could be trained. Schedules were adjusted with
student crews destined for SEA accelerated by
two months to enable the unit to reconstitute its
sixth crew as soon as possible. The 779th did an
outstanding job meeting this challenge. To maintain
a 14-aircraft fleet of Combat Talons, aircraft
64-0572 was designated by Air Staff to replace
aircraft 64-0547.
Along with the training provided to the Combat
Spear replacement crew, early 1968 was marked
by final preparation to deploy Combat Arrow
trained crews and maintenance personnel to the
7th Air Commando Squadron. (Note: After August
1968 all squadrons previously designated Air
Commando Squadrons became Special Operations
Squadrons.) The first Combat Talon and crew deployed
to Ramstein AB, Federal Republic of Germany,
on 24 February 1968. An additional crew
and aircraft arrived in Germany on 3 March, with
the third aircraft and crew arriving on the 28th of
June 1968 (see chap. 5).
For more than two years, the 779th had provided
trained personnel to fill Combat Talon requirements,
first in the Pacific and then later in
Europe. By the spring of 1968, the Air Force was
consolidating its US-assigned special operations
units in the Florida Panhandle at Eglin AFB Auxiliary
Field No. 9, which was also known as
Hurlburt Field. On 7 April 1968 the Combat
Talon training mission performed by the 779th
within TAC was transferred, along with its personnel
and equipment, to Detachment 3, 319th
Air Commando Squadron, Tactical Airlift. On 1
May 1968 the name of the new organization became
Detachment 2, 1st Special Operations Wing
(SOW), which was located at Hurlburt Field. 9 The
new detachment remained at Pope AFB as a tenant
unit but reported to the 1st SOW in Florida.
With Combat Talon assets deployed worldwide,
Combat Knife concentrated on developing its operational
mission. To this time almost all unit
resources were dedicated to the training mission.
In addition to operating the Combat Talon
schoolhouse, Detachment 2 was assigned the op -
erational mission of supporting unconventional
warfare plans of commander in chief, European
Command (CINCEUR); CINCPAC; commander in
chief, Southern Command (CINCSO); and commander
in chief, Strike Command (CINC-
STRIKE) for both limited and general war. Specific
tasks in support of this primary mission
included delivery of personnel and cargo by airdrop
or airland methods to designated points in
enemy territory; resupply of clandestine operations
conducted by US Army Special Forces and
other US government agencies; exfiltration of personnel,
equipment, cargo, and intelligence data
from the ground or water; dissemination of psychological
warfare materiel; pickup of escapee or
evadee personnel from designated safe areas
within enemy territory; and training of both aircrew
and maintenance personnel to support
worldwide Combat Talon requirements. 10
On 8 July 1968 Lt Col Pierce M. Meyers Jr.
became the new commander of Detachment 2.
Under Myers’s leadership the unit stabilized with
an authorized strength of 42 officers and 161 airmen.
11 There was another big push in the summer
of 1968 to replace Combat Spear personnel rotating
from SEA. As had been the case the previous
year, many personnel returned to Pope AFB after
their Vietnam tour, or they elected to PCS to the
7th SOS in Germany. Combat Talon had become
somewhat of a closed system and was composed of
experienced personnel who rotated among the
three squadrons. Detachment 2 benefited as experienced
personnel brought valuable combat skills
back to the unit.
In the haste to field the original Combat Talon
weapons system in 1966, which was driven by
SEA operational requirements, special Stray
Goose equipment installed on the aircraft had
never been through an OT&E to determine system
effectiveness. In May of 1968, during a Detachment
2 Combat Talon capabilities briefing to
the Special Air Warfare Center staff at Eglin
AFB, Florida, and to the staff of the 1st SOW, Maj
Cecil Clark identified the need for a formal
OT&E. In September Lt Col Howard Hartley, the
Combat Knife project officer for SOF on the TAC
staff, requested Maj George Hellier and Major
Clark brief him on Combat Knife capabilities and
limitations. Upon completion of the briefing and
armed with the knowledge of the need for a formal
OT&E, Colonel Hartley took the briefers with
him to the Air Staff to brief the shortfall and to
obtain support.
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