1 - The Black Vault

COMBAT KNIFE
During meetings with Air Staff personnel,
Colonel Black (AFXSME) discovered that there
was no fiscal 1970 funding for Combat Talon . Dis -
cussions further revealed that the TAC-assigned
Combat Knife unit lacked specific mission responsibility,
which prevented identification of future
funding. Without specific mission responsibility,
neither future modifications nor additional equipment
could be justified. Because of the meeting a
plan of action was developed to bring the Combat
Talon program into line to qualify the weapons
system for future funding. The plan included the
following recommendations: develop a concept of
employment; brief the SOF commander on Combat
Knife capabilities and limitations; brief the
TAC/DO and TAC/DPL on Combat Knife capabilities
and limitations; brief commander in chief, Atlantic
Command (CINCLANT) and CINCSTRIKE
on Combat Knife with the objective of including
the weapons system in their respective war plans;
and request TAC support a worldwide Combat
Talon conference to identify equipment and modification
requirements. 12
In October Gen Robert Gardenas, the commander
of TAC, was briefed and the following recommendations
were approved: (1) give a similar
briefing to CINCLANT and CINCSTRIKE; (2)
send a request to Air Staff (AFXOSO) to convene
a worldwide Combat Talon conference; and (3) request
Air Staff authorize a formal OT&E be conducted
on the Combat Talon weapons system. On
3 December 1968 Major Hellier and Major Clark
briefed CINCLANT and CINCSTRIKE planners
at Langley AFB, Virginia, and obtained tentative
agreement from both commands to review their
respective war plans for possible inclusion of
Combat Talon. 13
Six months had passed since Major Clark had
first briefed the OT&E shortfall, but the effort
paid off. The Air Staff approved a formal OT&E
for the Combat Talon weapons system. Additionally,
Air Staff began organizing the first Combat
Talon Management Review (CTMR) conference
and tentatively set a conference date for mid-
March 1968. And finally, staff actions were begun
between TAC and the Air Staff to determine the
extent Combat Knife could support CINCLANT
and CINCSTRIKE. 14 The initial OT&E shortfall
identified by Major Clark in May 1968 had ultimately
saved the entire Combat Talon program.
While the briefing process was going on during
the fall, Detachment 2 was able to get sufficiently
ahead of schoolhouse requirements to begin participating
in joint exercises. During November
Detachment 2 participated in two joint exercises—one
with the USA 7th Special Forces
Group and another with the 3d Special Forces
Group. Successful personnel and Fulton kit drops
were accomplished during these exercises, along
with Fulton STARS intercepts utilizing a training
dummy. During the last half of the year,
along with its limited exercise participation, Detachment
2 accomplished 200 day STARS, 80
night STARS, 86 day equipment drops, 86 night
equipment drops, 40 personnel drops, 11 Fulton
kit drops, 42 short-look maneuvers, and 510 airborne
intercepts with fighter aircraft and flew 38
hours engaged with RBS ground radar sites conducting
EWO training. 15 Although 1968 had been
a busy year, unit personnel looked forward to
1969 and upcoming opportunities flying the Combat
Talon .
1969: First Combat Talon
Management Review and the
Development of Operational
and Training Manuals
Detachment 2 personnel had enjoyed a quiet
holiday season and were ready to fly when January
arrived. On 16 January 1969 all was normal
as Maj James H. Browning and his crew prepared
a night training mission to be flown from
Pope AFB round-robin through the mountains of
western North Carolina. As aircraft 64-0558 approached
Brown Mountain, just east of Asheville,
for an unknown reason, the aircraft clipped a
ridgeline while in a shallow right turn. The aircraft
impacted trees with its right wing and severely
damaged the number four propeller, thus
causing the crew to shut down the engine immediately.
Tree debris also penetrated the right
wing fuel tank and the underbelly of the aircraft
just forward of the main landing gear. Thanks to
outstanding crew coordination and flying skills,
the crew maintained aircraft control with multipleengine
shutdowns and made an emergency landing
at the Hickory Municipal Airport, Hickory,
North Carolina. 16 No one was injured in the acci -
dent, but the aircraft required major repair. Initial
fieldwork was done at Hickory to enable the
aircraft to be flown back to depot for permanent
repair.
Postflight investigation could not determine
the cause of the accident, although 779th personnel
were convinced that the AN/APQ-115 radar
had somehow malfunctioned and allowed the aircraft
to descend to a point where it impacted the
63