1 - The Black Vault
1 - The Black Vault
1 - The Black Vault
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PRAETORIAN STARSHIP<br />
and fall on top of each other, thus causing failure<br />
of the parachute system and the destruction of<br />
the blivets. Some of the loadmasters had been in<br />
Talons since the Vietnam era and were familiar<br />
with MACVSOG’s “no questions asked” policy for<br />
their loads. After many debates, and some reservations,<br />
the blivets were accepted by the loadmasters<br />
and were rigged according to US Army<br />
specifications, then readied for the nighttime<br />
mission. 31<br />
<strong>The</strong> night was clear and crisp, with nearly 100<br />
percent moon illumination, when Brenci and Uttaro<br />
departed Davis-Monthan AFB. A route was<br />
planned that mirrored the one to be flown into<br />
Iran to give the crew experience in low-level operations<br />
flying one minute in trail with another<br />
Combat Talon. <strong>The</strong> Talon had been designed as a<br />
single-ship penetrator aircraft, so low-level formation<br />
in the terrain-following mode was not a normal<br />
procedure. <strong>The</strong> 8th SOS crews flew many sorties<br />
to develop procedures and skills to perform<br />
this maneuver. As the Talons traveled low over<br />
the desert floor, their shadows on the ground from<br />
the bright moon were clearly visible to the crew.<br />
Everyone on board was aware of the importance<br />
of the drop but was a bit apprehensive about the<br />
heavy 25,000-pound load and its unproven rigging<br />
procedures. About six minutes out from the drop,<br />
pilots from Benci’s crew wearing NVGs spotted<br />
light patterns on the ground resembling the<br />
Yuma DZ. After quickly determining the position<br />
of the aircraft, the left navigator assured the crew<br />
that the aircraft was still a significant distance<br />
from the DZ, so the crew continued to press on.<br />
Later debriefing by the crew determined that the<br />
lights were probably small campfires not visible<br />
to the naked eye, yet easily seen by the NVGs.<br />
<strong>The</strong> crew was thankful that they had not convinced<br />
themselves that the lights were on the DZ<br />
and dropped the load on unsuspecting campers.<br />
As the two aircraft lined up for the drop, the<br />
combat controller on the DZ called to confirm the<br />
run-in heading—a strange call since the whole operation<br />
was scheduled to be conducted radio-out.<br />
<strong>The</strong>re had apparently been a question concerning<br />
the orientation of the helicopters in relation to the<br />
Talon’s inbound drop heading. With the question<br />
answered, the formation continued towards the<br />
DZ. Brenci was in the lead with Uttaro one<br />
m inute in trail, and everything looked good for a<br />
successful drop. As the left navigator called<br />
“green light,” the blivets began to move. From<br />
the cockpit the shadows of the blivets were easily<br />
visible on the ground as they exited the aircraft.<br />
So, too, were the RH-53D helicopters lined up on<br />
the right side of the DZ. As the last blivet left the<br />
aircraft, the loadmaster called the load clear but<br />
relayed that a malfunction had occurred. Just as<br />
the Talon loadmasters had predicted, all five<br />
blivets accelerated out the aft end of the aircraft<br />
and literally fell on top of each other. As they left<br />
the aircraft, the force exerted on the aft anchorcable<br />
assembly caused it to fail and tear loose<br />
from the aft bulkhead. <strong>The</strong> cable shot forward<br />
and nearly beheaded Brenci’s radio operator,<br />
MSgt Andy Chitwood, who was untouched but<br />
shaken by the near miss. <strong>The</strong> incident reinforced<br />
the need for everyone in the cargo compartment<br />
to wear a helmet when air-dropping loads with<br />
static lines attached to the anchor cables.<br />
With the cable torn loose, the five blivets from<br />
Brenci’s aircraft streamed into the DZ, destroying<br />
them when they hit the ground. Uttaro was one<br />
minute behind Brenci and was not notified to<br />
abort his drop before two of his five blivets had<br />
pancaked onto the DZ. His aircraft experienced<br />
less damage than had Brenci’s, but seven of the<br />
10 blivets dropped were destroyed on the DZ. <strong>The</strong><br />
short flight back to Davis-Monthan AFB was sobering<br />
to all, especially for Chitwood.<br />
Inspection of the anchor cables revealed that<br />
the damage could be repaired, and by the next<br />
afternoon, the two aircraft were again mission<br />
ready for another attempt at the multiple CDS<br />
airdrop. <strong>The</strong> Combat Talon loadmasters devised<br />
a gate system whereby each blivet, as it moved<br />
towards the ramp of the aircraft by means of<br />
gravity, would cut the restraining cord for the<br />
following blivet. Thus, all five blivets would exit<br />
the aircraft with adequate spacing to allow each<br />
parachute to open without interfering with the<br />
one behind it. <strong>The</strong> two aircraft took off and flew<br />
their low-level routes as they had done the previous<br />
night. <strong>The</strong> airdrop went flawlessly, with all<br />
10 blivets safely landing on the DZ. By utilizing<br />
the gate system, however, the dispersion pattern<br />
on the ground was not as concentrated as was<br />
hoped, and efforts to move the blivets into position<br />
on the ground to refuel the helicopters took<br />
more time than was planned.<br />
Beckwith and his Delta Force had moved by<br />
way of the RH-53D helicopters to the DZ and<br />
had witnessed both nights’ operations along<br />
with Vaught and Kyle and the JTF planning<br />
staff. With the failure of the blivet drop on the<br />
first night, and the dispersion pattern of the<br />
second night’s drop, the consensus was that a<br />
better way had to be found to get fuel to the<br />
190