1 - The Black Vault

THE SON TAY PRISONER OF WAR RAID
Trang AB, Vietnam, in 1966. Ten of the 29 crew
members chosen for the Son Tay mission were
part of the initial SEA deployment. While in Vietnam,
Colonel Blosch commanded crew SG-04, and
Major Franklin commanded SG-06. They had com -
pleted their tours and had continued in the Talon
program—Colonel Blosch at the schoolhouse at
Pope AF B and Major Franklin at Ramstein AB. 30
Lt Col Benjamin N. Kraljev, a member of the
Ivory Coast Planning Group assigned to the Air
Staff, was familiar with Combat Talon from his
days assigned to Pope AFB. With General Manor’s
approval Colonel Kraljev contacted Colonel
Blosch, who was the operations officer and acting
squadron commander of Detachment 2, 1st SOW,
and arranged for a demonstration flight for a select
group of Pentagon staffers. Colonel Blosch
flew a Talon to Andrews AFB that same evening
and provided the requested demonstration. He
was told of his selection for the mission the next
morning. 31
Early in August Major Franklin had deployed
to RAF Greenham Commons, as part of the 7th
SOS contingent for Flintlock III. He received a
message from Headquarters USAFE through his
squadron commander directing him and his crew
to report to Eglin AFB and to await further instructions.
Major Franklin had upgraded to squadron
standardization and evaluation officer while assigned
to Pope AFB, and when he moved to Ramstein
AFB with Combat Arrow, he was assigned to
the squadron’s standardization/evaluation section
without a crew. The message from USAFE requested
each crew member by name, but the requested
crew members were dispersed throughout
the six assigned crews. To prevent affecting several
crews in the midst of a major exercise, the
squadron commander negotiated with USAFE to
provide his most capable hard crew and to provide
Major Franklin as its aircraft commander. Crew
members were not told anything about the mission
until their arrival at Eglin AFB on 28 August.
Both Colonel Blosch and Major Franklin
were highly qualified in the long-range, low-level,
single-ship Talon mission. Son Tay, however,
would require dissimilar formation skills not resident
anywhere in the Air Force, and the two aircraft
commanders would quickly be immersed in
developing these skills.
The primary mission of the Combat Talon for
the Son Tay raid was to escort the helicopter assault
force and to provide it with precision naviga -
tion across Laos and into North Vietnam. Talons
were not capable of helicopter air refueling, so a
third C-130—an HC-130P—was tasked to refuel
the helicopters over Laos, then hand off the formation
to the Combat Talon for the ingress portion
of the mission. The HC-130P did not have
adequate navigational or ECM equipment required
to penetrate North Vietnamese air defenses
and to reach Son Tay.
Formation flying with rotary-wing aircraft was
a new experience for Talon crews. Both Colonel
Blosch and Major Franklin quickly realized just
how difficult it would be to lead a dissimilar formation
into combat. Planners had chosen a
smaller aircraft (either the HH-3 or the UH-1) to
land inside the prison compound. A major prob -
lem arose over the maximum cruise airspeed of
the two aircraft. Their maximum cruise airspeed
was less than the minimum computed en route
airspeed for the Combat Talon .
Stall speed for the Combat Talon in the clean
configuration was approximately 12 knots above
the maximum cruise speed for the HH-3/UH-1.
Simply put, the Talon could not fly as slow as the
maximum capable speed of the two smaller helicopters.
Through testing and experimentation,
however, aircrews found that the slower helicop -
ters could draft in a position eight to 13 feet behind
and above the left wing of the Combat Talon
and increase their maximum cruise speed to 105
KIAS, which was an increase of 18 knots. At 105
KIAS and with 70 percent flaps extended, the
Combat Talon was five knots above its power-on
stall speed in straight and level flight and was
well within the flight envelope of the larger HH-
53s. The two aircraft commanders also found that
by using the two inboard engines at high-power
settings with the outboards at reduced power, the
Combat Talon could fly at a lower airspeed than
the computed stall speed. As long as symmetrical
power was maintained, the two commanders were
confident that planned airspeeds of 105 KIAS were
safe and posed little threat of the aircraft stalling.
Throttle technique was the key to slow-speed
flight, which was a skill the pilots developed during
the training phase. As fuel was burned during
the mission, the weight and stall speed of the
Talon would decrease, resulting in an even greater
margin of safety between the aircraft’s stall speed
and its en route airspeed. Mountain ranges in
eastern Laos and western North Vietnam would
require continuous turns and changes in altitude
and would present a challenging obstacle for the
slow-moving helicopter formation. 32
Aircrews were ready to start initial training by
late August 1970. Mission aircraft 64-0523 and
145