1 - The Black Vault
1 - The Black Vault
1 - The Black Vault
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THE IRANIAN RESCUE MISSION<br />
the rescue force (except perhaps the helicopters).<br />
Vaught quickly relayed the news to the CJCS<br />
and the Joint Staff that the JTF had a workable<br />
plan. He had a private meeting with the chairman<br />
and came away from it a bit deflated—the<br />
administration was getting cold feet regarding a<br />
military option. <strong>The</strong> political climate in Iran<br />
seemed to be swaying back towards a release of<br />
the hostages. <strong>The</strong> roller-coaster ride that the JTF<br />
had been on for three months had just taken a<br />
nosedive. 74<br />
At Hurlburt Field the Talon crews were ecstatic.<br />
Two solid months of intense training had<br />
paid off. Throughout the history of special operations,<br />
those who operated Combat Talon prized<br />
individualism and personal abilities. <strong>The</strong> nature<br />
of a lone Combat Talon penetrating hostile airspace<br />
at low level for hours on end bred a sense of<br />
independence and individualism in those who<br />
flew them. But the successful rehearsal brought<br />
out new feelings among the special operations<br />
participants—the feeling of teamwork and the realization<br />
that the sum of the parts for mission<br />
success was greater than the effort of a single<br />
crew. <strong>The</strong> rehearsal had been a success because of<br />
teamwork and because every individual involved<br />
did his best. Everyone was exhausted after the<br />
two-day practice, and an early beer at the club<br />
was a welcomed relief. <strong>The</strong> mission was doable,<br />
and the Combat Talon community was going to<br />
put the JTF on its back and make it happen.<br />
* * * * * *<br />
With Washington again in a wait-and-see<br />
mode, the intensity of JTF operations ratcheted<br />
down several notches during the early days of<br />
February. Part of the more relaxed climate was a<br />
direct result of the successful rehearsal conducted<br />
at Desert Rock and at Indian Springs. Turczynski<br />
took his two aircraft and crews back to Kadena<br />
AB, and the 8th SOS caught its breath as it concentrated<br />
on continuation-training requirements<br />
for the squadron. <strong>The</strong> general feeling at Hurlburt<br />
Field was that Washington had decided to pursue<br />
a political solution to the hostage crisis and that<br />
the mission was no longer high on President Carter’s<br />
list of options. Les Smith departed the 8th<br />
SOS and headed for Kadena AB as Turczynski’s<br />
new operations officer, and Brenci moved up to<br />
become the operations officer of the 8th SOS under<br />
Guidry.<br />
At J3-SOD Hess continued to coordinate actions<br />
of the JTF with Taylor’s OPG. Although<br />
much had been done by the JTF to develop the<br />
rescue option, the OPG had continued to look at<br />
other possibilities designed to punish Tehran if<br />
the hostages were harmed. <strong>The</strong> punitive-strike<br />
option by the four gunships stationed at Guam<br />
continued to be one such possibility. At the 8th<br />
SOS a fifth Combat Talon crew was formed in<br />
early January under the command of Capt John<br />
Arnold. His crew flew initial missions from 9 to 24<br />
January 1980 testing the feasibility of new technology<br />
that was designed to seriously degrade<br />
Tehran’s ability to produce and transport electrical<br />
power through its grid network. <strong>The</strong> program was<br />
code-named Project Elbow Rub and continued<br />
throughout 1980 in anticipation of employment<br />
against Iran. In early April Arnold and his primary<br />
loadmaster, Rudy Blazek, deployed to the<br />
Pacific with the capability, and two 1st SOS Combat<br />
Talons (aircraft 62-1843 and 63-7785) were<br />
modified to deliver it. A third 1st SOS crew, commanded<br />
by John Pearson, was trained for the Elbow<br />
Rub mission. Turczynski was selected by<br />
PACOM as the mission commander should the<br />
mission be employed. When Turczynski deployed<br />
to Diego Garcia in mid-April, Arnold and Blazek<br />
moved the Elbow Rub equipment by way of C-141<br />
to Diego Garcia to provide Turczynski the capability<br />
to use it should the situation dictate. Although<br />
neither the gunship strike nor the capability<br />
developed by Arnold and his crew was ever<br />
used against Iran, the OPG had both options<br />
ready in case they were needed.*<br />
February 1980: <strong>The</strong> Relentless<br />
Pursuit of Excellence<br />
Although the hectic pace had subsided a bit at<br />
Hurlburt Field, the February lull provided Brenci<br />
and his 8th SOS crews time to refine and perfect<br />
their newly acquired NVG, air-drop, and communications<br />
skills. Both Kyle and Hess went on<br />
much needed leaves after finishing postexercise<br />
requirements. <strong>The</strong> antenna that Oliver’s development<br />
team had manufactured was installed on a<br />
Combat Talon , and on 15 and 16 February, the<br />
SATCOM system was tested for its suitability to<br />
the MC-130E . <strong>The</strong> test validated the installation,<br />
giving commanders, from the president on down,<br />
the ability to communicate with the aircraft—in<br />
flight or on the grou nd—nearly anywhere in the<br />
__________<br />
*Project Elbow Rub remained highly classified throughout the 1990s. <strong>The</strong> exact nature of the capability developed during 1980 remained on the<br />
cutting edge of military technology. John Arnold continued to be associated with Special Operations and became known for his intellect and keen<br />
ability to grasp difficult concepts and then apply them to unique military requirements.<br />
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