1 - The Black Vault

ESTABLISHMENT OF COMBAT TALON
conducted by the United States. Several previous
directives addressing covert operations were also
rescinded at the same time. A follow-on NSC Directive,
5412/2, provided the national authority for
UW operations as conducted in SEA, namely,
propaganda, political action-economic warfare, preventive
direct action, including sabotage, antisabotage,
and demolition; escape, evasion, and
evacuation measures; subversion against hostile
states or groups, including resistance movements
and guerrilla or refugee liberation groups; support
of indigenous and anticommunist elements in
threatened countries of the Free World; and deception
plans and operations. 55 NSC 5412/2 further
stated that such operations did not include armed
conflict by recognized military forces, espionage,
and counterespionage, nor cover and deception for
military operations. 56 The most significant outcome
of Directive 5412/2 was the establishment of
Special Group (5412), which was the highest national
authority to grant approval and disapproval
of covert operations. 57
By August 1954 Colonel Lansdale’s SMM was
adequately staffed, and armed with the just issued
NSC Directive 5412, he commenced opera -
tions against the North. Paramilitary teams were
established in Hanoi, Haiphong, and south of the
17th parallel. Initial efforts centered on propa -
ganda campaigns utilizing leaflets distributed by
these teams designed to cast doubt on individual
ownership of property under the communists, on
money reform, and on individual freedoms. Sabotage
of key war-fighting materiel, such as contamination
of oil stocks, was an example of directaction-type
missions these teams performed.
Perhaps the most important mission assigned to
the paramilitary teams by SMM was the recruiting
and training of stay-behind indigenous forces
to be employed after the two countries were divided.
Another important mission was the caching
of supplies for use by these stay-behind forces. By
1955 Ho Chi Minh had assumed complete control
of the North, and an unofficial report reviewed
the accomplishments of the SMM up to that time:
“It had taken a tremendous amount of hard work
to beat the Geneva deadline—to locate, select, exfiltrate,
and equip the men of these (indigenous)
teams and have them in place, ready for actions
required against the enemy.” 58
In 1955 the US government put its support behind
Ngo Dinh Diem, a member of the Christian
minority in a predominately Buddhist South Vietnam.
Diem’s early successes to consolidate power
in the South was perceived in a positive light in
Washington and more aid was provided to his
government. The truth behind his early success
was, in fact, that Communist forces were concentrating
on consolidating power in the North and
had not yet begun large-scale, organized efforts in
the South. Just as SMM had equipped and trained
indigenous stay-behind forces in the North, Viet
Minh guerrillas (later known by Americans as
Vietcong) were organized and equipped in the
South to challenge the South Vietnamese government.
Beginning in 1957 the Viet Minh began escalating
armed attacks against Diem’s forces because
of actions taken by Diem that affected
Vietcong objectives in the South. These actions
included Diem’s cancellation of elections prescribed
by the Geneva Accord in 1956, his intensified
campaign to eliminate the Viet Minh in South
Vietnam by military force, and his close economic,
military, and political ties with America. Throughout
the remainder of the 1950s and through 1961,
the communist insurgency intensified and expanded
throughout South Vietnam. In September
1960 the US ambassador to Saigon advised President
John F. Kennedy that “it may become neces -
sary for the US government to begin consideration
of alternative courses of action and leaders.” 59
US-Soviet relations in early 1961 strengthened
America’s resolve to defend freedom in Southeast
Asia. In his now-famous speech of January 1961,
Nikita S. Khrushchev announced Moscow’s intention
to back “wars of national liberation” around
the world. In April of 1961 President Kennedy
suffered the humiliation of the Bay of Pigs fiasco,
which set off alarms in Washington that would
quickly be heard in Vietnam. On 20 April 1961,
the day after the attempted Bay of Pigs invasion
of Cuba, President Kennedy asked the secretary
of defense to apprise him of the Vietnam situation
and to recommend a course of action that would
prevent communist victory in Indochina. The resultant
plan submitted to President Kennedy articulated
a greater emphasis on covert and paramilitary
operations as well as deployment of
additional military and CIA personnel to South
Vietnam. With the president’s approval and endorsement
by the secretary of state and the secretary
of defense, the plan marked the beginning of
a commitment to SEA that would continue
throughout the 1960s and ultimately cost more
than 50,000 American lives and nearly fracture
the very foundation of American society. 60
The plan approved by President Kennedy advanced
the following authorities:
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