1 - The Black Vault

equired eight and one-half hours of darkness to
penetrate into the center of Iran, refuel, and fly
on to their hide site before first light. If all went
according to plan, the helicopters had an hour
and a half to spare. The last Combat Talon had
to be clear of Iranian airspace no later than nine
hours after darkness. Figuring a 30-minute pad
for the Talons and one hour for the helicopters, 1
May was the last night with nine and one-half
hours of darkness. The mission had to go on or
before that da te. 78
Life at Kadena AB had settled down a bit after
Jubelt and Osborne returned from the early February
exercise. The squadron had continued to refine
its blacked-out NVG procedures and had increased
its formed crews from two to three. Heavy
equipment drops, including the 5,000-pound
blivet, were not practiced because of the lack of
equipment and rigging support in the Pacific.
Communications-out IFR and low-level formation
procedures were practiced. The month of February
passed quickly as the Pacific Combat Talon
crews maintained their flight proficiency, and
March began with no indication of increased JTF
activity. Osborne reluctantly went on a long
leave with his family to Taiwan. Two days after
his departure, Turczynski got a call to deploy two
aircraft and two crews back to the United States.
With Osborne off the island, Fleming moved up
to aircraft commander, and Rumple was added to
the second crew as the safety pilot. Turczynski’s
three crews included the following personnel:*
Crew 1 Crew 2 Crew 3
Jubelt Fleming Pearson
Nimmo Schwall Osborne
Turczynski Rumple Wilson
Sumida Peppers Ozlins
Smith Townsend Ross
Prater Novy Perkumas
Tafoya Felton Banks
Diehl Devine Farrell
Frederickson Hickman Kirby
Joy Huff Baker
– – – – Hamilton
Deployment to Hurlburt Field went smoothly
for Jubelt and Fleming. They arrived back in
Florida to find the 8th SOS preparing for another
full-blown dress rehearsal. The next exercise was
scheduled for 25–27 March.
THE IRANIAN RESCUE MISSION
* * * * * *
From the early stages of Operation Rice Bowl,
JTF planners had selected Manzariyeh as the
Night Two exfiltration location. Night One had
remained up in the air as various options were
considered. The first option developed by the JTF
was to air-drop fuel blivets in an isolated location
in the interior of Iran, and then refuel the helicopters
from these blivets. Beckwith did not like this
option because there were too many variables in
the plan. What if the blivets landed in a ravine
and couldn’t be moved? Or, what if the helicopters
could not find the blivets after they were airdropped?
What if the pa rachute-delivery system
failed? Beckwith’s unanswered list of questions
was a long one. The second option, and the one
most exercised during the training phase leading
up to the March rehearsal, was airlanding the
fixed-wing aircraft on a small, disused airfield
somewhere in central Iran and seizing it for followon
refueling operations. This option left the
ranger security force on the airfield for 24 hours
while Delta Force, aboard the helicopters, moved
to the Tehran area for the rescue. The rangers
would be exfiltrated the following night at the
same time that Delta Force and the hostages were
being extracted. Planners felt this option was
somewhat “iffy” because of the extended time required
on the ground in Iran. The third option
considered by JTF planners called for a landing at
a remote desert-landing site and refueling the
helicopters from the C-130s. After completion of
the refueling operation, the C-130s would depart
Iran before first light, and the helicopters would
proceed to a laager site to await Night Two.
The challenge for the third option was finding a
suitable landing site that could support heavy C-
130 aircraft. By February the JTF intelligence
section had located a site that promised to fulfill
the Night One airland requirement. The location
was a large, flat area of compacted sand located
approximately 530 miles from the southwest coast
of Iran and about 220 miles from the desert hide
site selected for the overnight layover of the helicop -
ters. Using those distances, the helicopters could
reach the location from their carrier launch point,
refuel, fly to the hide site, and still have enough
fuel to make it to Tehran to pick up the hostages
and then fly on to Manzariyeh. There was one
drawback to the location—a dirt road ran down
the center of the area being considered for the
__________
*Crew 3 was the primary Elbow Rub crew and the spare crew for the rescue mission. Had Elbow Ru b launched, Pearson’s crew would have been
augmented by Arnold, Blazek, and Turczynski, the mission commander.
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