1 - The Black Vault

Chapter 7
Between the Wars
(1975–79)
Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty.
—Thomas Jefferson
For more than 10 years, the United States had
overtly supported its allies in SEA. The long
struggle against communist aggression had
sapped the will of the American people to continue
the war. By the fall of 1974, only a short
time remained before all American combat forces,
which were primarily those of the US Air Force by
that time, would be withdrawn from the theater.
Combat Talon Fights for Survival
High-altitude CDS airdrops into Cambodia by
the 1st SOS during the summer of 1974 were the
last Combat Talon activity there. Unconventional
warfare and special operations were tied to the
SEA theater of operations, so it was predictable
that the USAF looked hard at SOF when force
reductions were considered.
1st and 7th SOS Narrowly
Escape Deactivation
In the Office of the Chief of Staff, Air Force,
message dated 030023Z December 1974, the 1st
SOS was identified for inactivation during the
fourth quarter of 1975. Subsequent message traffic
changed the deactivation date to the first quarter
of 1976 and included the 7th SOS, which was still
located at Rhein Main AB, FRG. The Air Staff
plan consisted of the transfer of the eight Combat
Talons assigned to the two overseas units to the
8th SOS at Hurlburt Field, Florida, thus forming a
TAC-assigned 12 aircraft Combat Talon unit. Because
of NATO’s European troop commitments,
the 8th SOS would be required to maintain a fouraircraft
detachment in Europe until force level
questions could be resolved. 1 There would be no
Combat Talons left in the Pacific under the reorganization
plan. Air Staff gave PACAF and
USAFE the opportunity to respond to the planned
action.
In its 270650Z December 1974 response, Fifth
AF (the numbered Air Force unit to which the 1st
SOS was assigned) expressed its concern to PACAF
over the loss of the unique Combat Talon capability
in the Pacific. It pointed out that the 1st SOS
was the only unconventional warfare asset in
PACAF and that its inactivation would reduce
UW assets to zero. Familiarity with potential operating
locations throughout the Pacific theater
gained by theater presence would be lost. It noted
that response time for contingencies would be
greatly increased, and the ability to support deployed
forces would be reduced due to the lack of
ava ilable parts in-theater. Perhaps the greatest
argument for retention of the weapons system in
PACAF was the emerging Republic of Korea requirement
for the maritime surveillance of its
coastal waters.
Initial sea surveillance tests were conducted
by the 1st SOS in August of 1974 at Subic Bay,
Philippines, at 10,000 feet altitude using the
FLIR as a television monitor. 2 On 13 September
1974, the 314th AD, located at Osan AB, ROK,
working in concert with the Republic of Korea Air
Force, identified the need for night surveillance of
the ROK’s offshore islands to inhibit North Korean
infiltration operations. At the direction of
CINCPACAF, the 314th AD provided a concept of
operation (CONOP) for utilizing the Combat
Talon in the infiltration detection mission. Upon
review of the 314th AD’s proposed concept, Headquarters
PACAF pronounced it sound on 25 October
and forwarded it to the CSAF. 3
A second series of tests were run on 6 and 7
December at 1,000 feet altitude using professional
photographers. During this test, one photograph
was taken of the FLIR picture and a second of the
actual target. Analysis of the two pictures confirmed
that the FLIR presentation was accurate
and that recognition of the target could be easily
made from the photograph. The FLIR had the ca -
pability to be tied directly to a video recorder,
thus enabling the operator to acquire the target,
analyze and evaluate it, and record the image on
videotape or photograph it from the FLIR scope
without additional assistance. 4
Although the CONOP for the sea surveillance
mission was still being developed, Fifth AF felt
it was too soon to scrap the promising capability
by deactivating the squadron. Also citing the
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