1 - The Black Vault

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP
the force. By sourcing one aircraft from PACAF,
one aircraft from TAC, and one aircrew each from
TAC and USAFE, no single unit was overtaxed.
Ongoing programs were not negatively affected. 23
As detailed planning continued during the second
week of August, several capabilities not found
on the Combat Talon were identified as being essential
for mission success. One such requirement
was the FLIR. There was no FLIR capability on
the Combat Talon at the time, but an FLIR system
was in use on similar Heavy Chain C-130E
aircraft. Arrangements were made to borrow two
FL-2B FLIR systems from Heavy Chain and to
mount them on the two Combat Talons with a
temporary external pod configuration. The two aircraft
were modified during the late August period
and returned to Eglin AFB in time to participate
in the September training phase. FLIR was considered
essential to the helicopter escort mission
because most of the turn points during the lowlevel
route were river crossings or lakes, and the
early generation FLIR did a good job of identify -
ing the contrast between land and water. 24 Another
innovation to assist the Combat Talon in
acquiring the helicopter after inadvertent formation
breakup was the installation of the ground
acquisition responder/interrogator (GAR/I) beacon
on the helicopter. The GAR/I was designed to
identify a signal transmitted from a drop zone to
the aircraft to help assist the navigator during
blacked-out airdrops. For the raid, a GAR/I beacon
was installed on each helicopter, and the
Combat Talon successfully read their positions
when interrogated. 25
An additional requirement for Combat Talon
was the capability to drop napalm to create a
ground marker for the A-1 attack aircraft. Planners
needed a ground marker that would burn for
an extended period, thus providing the A-1s a
point of reference from which to orbit in proximity
to the ground attack. In the event the ground
force commander needed assistance, the A-1s
could respond in minimal time from their holding
locations. Conventional delivery of the BLU-27/B
napalm canister by fighter aircraft resulted in a
large area of flame that burned for only a short
period. For Son Tay the BLU-27/B was modified to
function as a visual ground marker that required
special rigging and palletizing for C-130 delivery.
A developmental and test program was conducted
on the Eglin AFB ranges that produced all procedures
and checklists necessary for handling, loading,
and delivering the munitions. Drag chutes
from old B-47 drop tanks were available through
supply channels, and these chutes were acquired
and attached to the BLU-27/B napalm canisters.
The palletized canisters were then dropped on the
Eglin AFB range. Napalm delivered in this vertical
manner tended to pool in a concentrated area
and burned for nearly an hour. Duration of the
assault was planned for 30 minutes. With General
Manor’s 100 percent redundancy requirement,
the extended burn time was certified as
a cceptable. 26
Another requirement identified by the Ivory
Coast planners was the dropping of firefight
simulators to confuse any enemy troops in the
area and to delay their response to the prison
assault. The simulators were actually firecrackers
encased in a plastic sleeve that were dropped utilizing
a pallet system from the Combat Talon and,
once on the ground, sounded as if an actual firefight
was under way. 27 Flares were also needed to
illuminate the Son Tay Prison compound. The
conventional flare utilized in SEA was the Mark
24, but it was a high-altitude flare that could not
be dropped at low level. The maximum altitude
over Son Tay was 1,500 feet, based upon the SAM
and AAA threat in the immediate area. The Mark
24 was unacceptable even at this altitude. The
Mark 6, or MK-6 log flare, was similar to a railroad
flare and could be delivered manually at low
altitude from the rear of the aircraft. (There was
no aircraft delivery system designed for this type
flare.) A supply of MK-6s was procured for Combat
Talon use and was tested over the Eglin AFB
range. Testing proved quite successful. The longburning
flare created acceptable light and had the
added advantage of creating confusion on the
ground when it started small fires amongst enemy
forces. 28
With modifications under way and personnel
selected to participate in the raid, flight training
commenced on 20 August 1970. The next 60 days
would prove to be demanding yet rewarding for
the entire force.
Training in Northwest Florida
In August of 1970 Colonel Blosch and Major
Franklin were recognized as two of the most experienced
Combat Talon aircraft commanders then
flying the sophisticated weapons system. Colonel
Blosch had been one of two pilots in the Air Force
who was qualified to fly the slot position on a fourship
C-130 demonstration team known as the
Hercules Horseman while stationed in PACAF’s
315th Air Division. 29 Both men were part of the
initial cadre Stray Goose deployment to Nha
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