1 - The Black Vault
1 - The Black Vault
1 - The Black Vault
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THE IRANIAN RESCUE MISSION<br />
were other courses of action briefed to General<br />
Meyer that included operations from Kuwait,<br />
Bahrain, or Saudi Arabia, but all of these options,<br />
including Turkey, were ruled out for both security<br />
and political reasons. As other options were proposed<br />
during the ensuing days, Egypt and Diego<br />
Garcia emerged as the only two staging bases acceptable<br />
to Jones and the Joint Staff. <strong>The</strong>se two<br />
staging bases were 5,000–7,000 miles from Tehran<br />
and required a 24-hour round-trip flight by way of<br />
C-130 aircraft with two to three air refuelings en<br />
route. To get Delta Force to an undetected position<br />
near the embassy, and then to extract the<br />
force with the hostages in tow, required rotarywing<br />
aircraft. <strong>The</strong> process of identifying the<br />
proper helicopter for the operation would prove to<br />
be challenging for mission planners. One concession<br />
that Jones offered to planners was the utilization<br />
of Saudi Arabian airspace during either ingress<br />
or egress, thus reducing flight time from<br />
Egypt to Tehran to approximately 12 hours. For<br />
planning purposes, Turkish airspace was also approved<br />
for egress after the hostages had been rescued.<br />
To avoid transiting Saudi airspace twice on<br />
successive nights, which could compromise the<br />
mission, the long 24-hour flight around the kingdom<br />
was still facing planners for the ingress<br />
route. With these restrictions foremost in mind,<br />
SOD set about to identify forces that were capable<br />
of accomplishing the mission. To get Delta Force<br />
into Iran over such vast distances was clearly in<br />
the USAF’s area of responsibility.<br />
* * * * * *<br />
It was surprising that the United States had<br />
not developed a joint counterterrorist capability<br />
by late 1979. Three years before the embassy<br />
takeover in Iran, on 3 and 4 July 1976, Israeli<br />
commandos had conducted a raid on Entebbe International<br />
Airport in Kampala, Uganda, to rescu e<br />
105 Israelis taken when an Air France jetliner<br />
was hijacked. <strong>The</strong> terrorists were sym pathetic to<br />
the Palestine Liberation Organization and had<br />
threatened to kill the hostages if Israel failed to<br />
meet their demands. Operation Jonathan, the<br />
code name for the rescue, relied upon a highly<br />
specialized commando force supported by Israeli<br />
air force C-130 aircrews. During the operation,<br />
six terrorists were killed while the Israelis lost<br />
two commandos and four civilian hostages. <strong>The</strong><br />
following year, on 18 October 1977, West German<br />
GSG-9 counterterrorist forces killed four Arab<br />
terrorists when they stormed a hijacked<br />
Lufthansa airliner at the airport at Mogadishu,<br />
Somalia. 10 Each rescue was considered a tactical<br />
success.<br />
As international terrorism increased, visionaries<br />
in the US Army realized that it was only a matter<br />
of time before the United States would become a<br />
terrorist target. Accordingly, on 19 November<br />
1977, with chief of staff of the Army (CSA) Gen<br />
Bernard W. Rogers’s support, Delta Force was activated<br />
at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. <strong>The</strong> activa -<br />
tion order described the unit’s mission, its basic<br />
structure, and its high priority for obtaining<br />
equipment and personnel to bring it to missionready<br />
status. <strong>The</strong> man chosen to head the new<br />
unit was Colonel Beckwith, a seasoned Vietnam<br />
veteran who had also completed an exchange tour<br />
with the British Special Air Service. 11 From the<br />
time of activation and throughout its first two<br />
years of operation, Beckwith and Delta Force<br />
fought an uphill battle for funds and personnel,<br />
even though the activation order clearly provided<br />
US Army priority in both areas. By the summer of<br />
1978, Delta Force was still only partially mission<br />
capable. At the direction of General Meyer, the<br />
US Army deputy chief of staff for operations at<br />
the time, and with the support of General Rogers,<br />
an initial evaluation and validation of the unit<br />
was conducted. Although Beckwith and his men<br />
passed the limited evaluation, those closely associated<br />
with Delta Force at that time felt that many<br />
areas of the evaluation were unfair and did not adequately<br />
measure Delta Force’s capabilities.<br />
Throughout the remainder of 1978, Delta Force<br />
continued to field special equipment and recruit<br />
top personnel for the unit. By 1979 the unit began<br />
to do some advanced training activities outside<br />
the United States. A typical European training<br />
mission would include deploying a Delta Force<br />
member to West Germany, who would be met by<br />
a member of the 10th Special Forces Group and<br />
then briefed on a notional mission involving a terrorist<br />
attack on a US citizen. <strong>The</strong> Delta Force<br />
operator would have a strict timetable to complete<br />
his mission, which usually involved in-depth target<br />
research and reconnaissance of the notional<br />
target and development of a course of action to<br />
free the hostage. Once the mission was complete,<br />
the operator returned to Fort Bragg, where he<br />
was debriefed and evaluated regarding the mission.<br />
In addition to these overseas deployments for<br />
training, Delta Force began an exchange program<br />
in 1979 with the British Special Air Service. Representatives<br />
from the Special Air Service visited<br />
Delta Force at Fort Bragg and provided training in<br />
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