1 - The Black Vault
1 - The Black Vault
1 - The Black Vault
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<strong>The</strong> 1st SOW maintained the four gunship detachment<br />
on Guam for the next four months, redeploying<br />
to Hurlburt Field on 3 March 1980. 16<br />
<strong>The</strong> gunship mission envisioned by OPG involved<br />
a punitive strike against a coastal target in<br />
Iran. After deploying from Guam to Diego Garcia,<br />
the gunship force would fly a 21-hour round-trip<br />
mission from there to its target along Iran’s coast.<br />
Navy carrier-based fighter aircraft and SAC KC-<br />
135 tankers would support the strike. Retaliatory<br />
strikes were planned by OPG in the event that<br />
Khomeini’s terrorists in the embassy began killing<br />
the hostages, a threat that had been made<br />
early in the crisis. Two other OPG scenarios included<br />
the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz at the<br />
entrance to the Persian Gulf and the seizure of Iran’s<br />
Kharg Island oil refinery complex. If retaliatory<br />
strikes were executed, SOD’s rescue option would<br />
no longer be viable. 17<br />
Combat Talon Is Selected<br />
for the Rescue Mission<br />
<strong>The</strong> distances from Diego Garcia and Egypt<br />
were enormous. Kyle and his small SOD staff<br />
looked at possible weapons systems that could do<br />
the job. <strong>The</strong>re was only one aircraft capable of<br />
in-flight refueling, covert penetration of hostile<br />
airspace, and precision navigation to some point<br />
in the heart of Iran, and that aircraft was the<br />
MC-130E Combat Talon. Kyle briefed Vaught on<br />
his Talon requirements, and on 14 November<br />
Vaught approved Kyle’s request to bring three<br />
planners familiar with the weapons system to<br />
Washington. <strong>The</strong> next stop for Kyle was Lee Hess,<br />
who recommended Lt Col Les Smith (the operations<br />
officer of the 8th SOS), Maj Doug Ulery (a<br />
highly experienced Combat Talon navigator and<br />
mission planner), and Maj Paul Gorsky (a highly<br />
experienced navigator assigned to TAC headquarters).<br />
Hess reasoned that Smith could return<br />
t o Hurlburt Field to put the Combat Talon package<br />
together after initial planning and would<br />
transition to be the JTF’s point of contact for the<br />
squadron. Ulery was well known by both Kyle and<br />
Hess, all three having worked together on Korean<br />
issues while they were assigned to the Pacific.<br />
Gorsky had been previously assigned to the<br />
Heavy Chain program (1198th OT&E Squadron)<br />
and participated in the initial flight tests and verifi -<br />
cation of the MOD-70 upgrade. He would act as<br />
the JTF liaison officer to TAC as the preparation for<br />
the mission progressed. 18 Hess also connected Kyle<br />
__________<br />
*Kyle and Turczynski both served on the PACAF staff and trusted each other’s judgment.<br />
THE IRANIAN RESCUE MISSION<br />
with Turczynski. During a 15 November secure<br />
telephone call, Kyle asked Turczynski to continue<br />
the no-light landings that the squadron had begun<br />
on 7 November.* Kyle also authorized Turczynski<br />
to brief the 18th TFW/DO on the mission and<br />
gave him Col Bob Pinard’s name as the 1st SOW<br />
point of contact at Hurlburt Field.<br />
<strong>The</strong> three Combat Talon planners arrived in<br />
Washington on 16 November. Kyle and Hess immediately<br />
briefed them, and they began looking<br />
at possible ingress and egress routes. <strong>The</strong> SOD<br />
plan had evolved into a two-night operation that<br />
included both USAF Combat Talons and US Navy<br />
RH-53D helicopters. Night One would utilize an<br />
isolated airfield in southern Egypt, known as<br />
Wadi Kena (also identified as location Alpha),<br />
from which Combat Talons and KC-135 tankers<br />
would launch. From Wadi Kena, the force would<br />
fly down the Red Sea clear of Saudi Arabian airspace<br />
and refuel over international waters abeam<br />
South Yemen. <strong>The</strong> force would continue eastward<br />
along the coast of Saudi Arabia and turn north<br />
near Masirah Island over the Gulf of Oman. <strong>The</strong><br />
Combat Talons would cross the Gulf of Oman and<br />
fly east of the Strait of Hormuz at low level, penetrating<br />
Iranian airspace at a point where intelligence<br />
indicated a gap in radar coverage. Once<br />
over land, options to either drop fuel or airland<br />
were still to be worked out. Planners were instructed<br />
to build their low-level route to a point<br />
300–400 NM from Tehran. Further refinement of<br />
the overland portion of the mission would be done<br />
after helicopter rendezvous and refueling options<br />
were finalized. 19 A different egress route would be<br />
flown after refueling the helicopters, with all<br />
Combat Talons landing back at Wadi Kena after a<br />
second air refueling (fig. 30).<br />
Utilizing Saudi Arabian airspace, Night Two<br />
would depart Wadi Kena and cross Saudi Arabia<br />
north of Riyadh, where an aerial refueling would<br />
take place with KC-135 tankers. After refueling,<br />
the Combat Talons would continue on to the Persian<br />
Gulf, enter low level, and penetrate Iranian<br />
airspace east of Kuwait. Available intelligence<br />
had not pinpointed any gaps in Iranian coastal<br />
defenses in the northern Persian Gulf area, so<br />
from the penetration point onward, the route was<br />
initially left unplanned. In the event Egypt denied<br />
use of Wadi Kena, an alternate plan was<br />
developed that called for launch and recovery<br />
from Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, then lowlevel<br />
penetration of the Iranian coast near the<br />
same point as planned from Egypt. 20<br />
185