1 - The Black Vault

PRAETORIAN STARSHIP
forces in being in 1985 were not adequate to cope
with the worldwide threat to US citizens. Congress
looked for ways to improve the capability of
America’s counterterrorism. In August of 1985
Representative Daniel, still not convinced that
the three services (Army, Navy, and Air Force)
were serious about building a robust special operations
capability to fight the terrorist threat,
published an article in Armed Forces Journal advocating
the creation of a sixth service dedicated
to special operations and low-intensity conflict.
Many felt at the time that the true objective of
Daniel’s article was to stimulate controversy
within the services and in Congress so that action
would be taken to improve SOF. Daniel was convinced
that service SOF initiatives up to that time
had treated the symptoms of the disease rather
than the causes. He felt that although SOF was
organizationally part of the three services, SOF
had never been truly institutionally part of those
services. He argued that SOF did not “fit” into the
conventional military and concluded that the system
didn’t work because the individual services
held SOF to be peripheral to the interests, missions,
goals, and traditions that the services
viewed essential. Listing seven key reasons a
sixth service was needed, Daniel believed that
anything less would result in continued poor performance
by SOF because the services ultimately
would determine the health of SOF by controlling
forces and dollars committed to it. 36
In October 1985 a two-year Senate Armed
Services Committee staff study, “Defense Organization:
The Need for Change,” was published. The
staff study was headed by James Locher and included
a detailed look at the Department of Defense
and the national command structure. Locher
and his staff looked at a number of special
operations as part of their research, including
those in Vietnam, Iran, and Grenada, and concluded
that America did not have a good record of
accomplishments in successfully completing unconventional
operations. Historical analysis dating
back to the American Revolution provided the
basis of a series of recommendations contained in
the study. His staff report concluded that a new
command structure was essentially needed when
it proposed a “strong . . . multifunctional, organiza -
tional focus for low-intensity warfare and special
operations.” Many in Congress took Locher’s staff
study seriously and throughout 1986 worked to see
that the recommendations were implemented. The
October 1985 staff study formed the foundation
for the Goldwater–Nichols Defense Reorganization
Act of 1986, which revolutionized SOF and the
Combat Talon force. 37
In the Air Force the fiasco of 1984’s Initiative
17 had faded into the past, but the service’s commitment
to SOF still was questioned by many.
Five additional C-130H aircraft (84-0475, 84-
0476, 85-0011, 85-0012, and 86-1699) were delivered
to the Air Force during calendar year 1985
as part of the CT II program, but the radar prob -
lem had not been solved. Because the radar had
been envisioned as an off-the-shelf acquisition,
Air Force program managers had made the decision
not to remanufacture the older CT I radar
because of its cost—it was estimated that the
APQ-122(V)8 would cost between $8 and 10 million
each, and the conventional Air Force wanted
a cheaper radar for the CT II. All five aircraft
received the HSLLADS modification at LAS Ontario
before being delivered to E-Systems in 1986.
Air Force contracted with IBM to develop a new
TF/TA-capable radar for the CT II, but the company
subcontracted the effort to Emerson Electronics.
The resultant poor performance of the
Emerson radar nearly resulted in the cancellation
of the entire CT II program. Congressional interest
in CT II development had continued, thus
leaving the Air Force little choice but to continue
to work with the contractor to bring the radar up
to operational status. In the end the AN/APQ-170
radar emerged as the radar for the new Talon at a
cost of nearly $20 million each, and the delivery of
the first operational aircraft to the 8th SOS was
delayed until 1991. 38
In September 1985 Maj Gen Robert B. Patterson
assumed command of the Twenty-Third AF
and quickly set about to develop a road map for
future SOF expansion within the Air Force. Look ing
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USAF Photo
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The new Combat Talon II has an extended radome and
chin-mounted FLIR turret. The large radome is re -
quired to accommodate both the FLIR and the AN/APQ-
170 radar.
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