1 - The Black Vault
1 - The Black Vault
1 - The Black Vault
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PRAETORIAN STARSHIP<br />
and other reconnaissance assets; PACAF owned<br />
additional fixed- and rotary-wing assets needed<br />
(including Talons, A-1s, and helicopters) for the<br />
operation; and USAFE owned a contingent of<br />
Combat Talons and crews from which to draw additional<br />
support. 11<br />
With a green light from the JCS, the already<br />
hectic planning tempo accelerated. <strong>The</strong> next major<br />
milestone was the selection of a mission commander.<br />
On 10 July USAF brigadier general<br />
Leroy Manor received a telephone call from the<br />
Pentagon shortly after SACSA briefed the mission<br />
to the JCS. He was told that he had been selected<br />
to command a special mission for the Joint Chiefs<br />
of Staff. He was instructed to fly to Washington<br />
the next day and to make an operation’s stop at<br />
Pope AFB, North Carolina, to pick up a US Army<br />
colonel named Arthur D. Simons. General Manor<br />
was, at the time, the commander, USAF SOF, located<br />
at Eglin AFB, Florida, and was responsible<br />
for training Air Force Special Operations Forces<br />
supporting worldwide tasking, including Combat<br />
Talon operations in SEA and in Europe. He was a<br />
highly respected Air Force general officer and<br />
combat veteran, having flown 345 missions in<br />
World War II and in Vietnam. He was the former<br />
wing commander of the 37th Tactical Fighter<br />
Wing stationed at Phu Cat, South Vietnam. 12<br />
General Manor thought it strange that he was<br />
directed to stop and pick up an Army colonel at<br />
Pope AFB. Although they had never met, General<br />
Manor would soon come to appreciate the abilities<br />
of Colonel Simons, who, as it turned out, had been<br />
designated the ground force commander. Colonel<br />
Simons’s nickname was “Bull,” and he had earned<br />
his reputation through three decades of soldiering.<br />
He had entered the Army in 1941 as a second<br />
lieutenant fresh out of Reserve Officer Training<br />
Corps. After his light artillery unit was disbanded<br />
while in New Guinea, his unit was absorbed into<br />
the Sixth Rangers. He commanded B Company of<br />
the Sixth Rangers during the invasion of the Philippines.<br />
In the early 1960s he worked with General<br />
<strong>Black</strong>burn preparing Special Forces’s soldiers<br />
for White Star team operations in Laos. His mission<br />
there was to help establish a Laotian army<br />
and to instruct it in basic military skills. Bull Simons<br />
joined SOG when General <strong>Black</strong>burn was<br />
its commander in 1965; he enjoyed General <strong>Black</strong>burn’s<br />
complete trust. 13<br />
General Manor and Colonel Simons reviewed<br />
the operational plan that General <strong>Black</strong>burn and<br />
his staff had briefed to the JCS. Both concurred<br />
with the feasibility study group that the mission<br />
was, indeed, possible. Meetings were held with<br />
DIA, CIA, and National Security Agency representatives<br />
where the two men were pledged complete<br />
support from each agency. With a window of<br />
18–25 October only three months away, much<br />
work needed to be done to establish the JCTG and<br />
bring it up to mission-ready status. A rough timetable<br />
was worked out to ensure the raiding force<br />
was trained and ready. <strong>The</strong> two commanders<br />
would return to their respective locations and immediately<br />
begin selection of the nucleus of their<br />
force. On 8 August they would return to Washington<br />
with their deputies for a five-day detailed<br />
planning session. A training site would be selected<br />
during the planning session, and a detailed training<br />
plan would be prepared and ready by 20 August.<br />
<strong>The</strong> OPLAN would be completed by 28 August,<br />
with actual training commencing by 9<br />
September. Support missions, including SR-71<br />
and unmanned drone reconnaissance flights over<br />
North Vietnam, would be laid on during this period.<br />
Cover stories would be developed by a special<br />
security section in SACSA, and measures to<br />
prevent information leaks would be put into<br />
place. <strong>The</strong> raiding force would be fully trained<br />
and ready to deploy by 10 October to meet the<br />
first mission window. 14<br />
General Manor and Colonel Simons used sepa -<br />
rate approaches to find and recruit volunteers for<br />
the mission. At Fort Bragg Colonel Simons selected<br />
his key deputies and then discreetly put<br />
out the word that he was looking for volunteers<br />
for a “moderately hazardous” mission, instructing<br />
all who were interested to form up in the base<br />
theater at an appointed time. Through an extensive<br />
process whereby Colonel Simons personally<br />
interviewed every volunteer, just over 100 men<br />
were selected from the 500 who answered the call.<br />
This group would be reduced later to a raiding<br />
force of 56 men. 15<br />
General Manor used a different approach. He<br />
called in men whom he was sure would volunteer<br />
and told them only that he had a highly classified<br />
mission and asked if they would like to participate<br />
with him. He explained that there were some risks<br />
and that it was a good project, but he did not disclose<br />
the actual objective of the mission. He offered<br />
to excuse anyone who did not want to participate. 16<br />
<strong>The</strong> Air Force contingent consisted of aircrews<br />
and support personnel for two Combat Talons,<br />
five A-1E Skyraiders, one HH-3, and five HH-53<br />
helicopters. 17 One Combat Talon crew was sourced<br />
from Detachment 2, 1st SOW, Pope AFB and was<br />
commanded by Colonel Blosch. <strong>The</strong> second Talon<br />
142