1 - The Black Vault

THE IRANIAN RESCUE MISSION
a decision whether his Combat Talon would be
used for the return of the aircrew remains to the
United States. Meller was eventually released,
and on 2 May 1980 his crew arrived back at
Hurlburt Field, Florida, in Combat Talon 64-
0572, the last to return home from the mission.
The month of May revolved around honoring
the fallen airmen and marines, with memorial
services held at Hurlburt Field and in Washington,
D.C., and funeral services conducted at the
Air Force Academy and in Valdosta, Georgia. On
9 May 1980 President Carter presided over a memorial
service at Arlington National Cemetery for
the eight men lost at Desert One. As the special
operations community buried its dead, the inevitable
investigations began to determine what happened
at Desert One and who was to blame for
the failure.
The Senate Armed Services Committee convened
on 7 May 1980 to investigate the failed mission.
Chaired by Sen. John Stennis, the committee
was limited to asking questions regarding the
rescue mission from the time of its inception up to
its failure at Desert One. There was to be no
speculation on any planning for a follow-up attempt.
Vaught, Gast, Kyle, Beckwith, and the Ma -
rine helicopter formation commander, Lt Col Ed
Seiffert, testified before the senators. The hearing
opened with Stennis reading a statement that
everyone on the committee had pride in their
military and that the purpose of the hearing was
to learn the facts behind the failed mission. Sen.
Barry Goldwater, who had supported the president
in his decision to execute the mission, insisted
that no person be admonished or demoted
because of the failure. Sen. Strom Thurmond expressed
concern over command and control issues.
As the hearing progressed, Sen. Sam Nunn cut to
the heart of the matter when he asked two important
questions: What had we learned from the
failure? and What could be done to make the system
better for the future? 149 Both questions
needed answering, and Beckwith provided an answer
to the second one—establish a permanent
task force responsible for the counterterrorism
mission. The seeds were planted during the hearings
that would eventually grow into the establishment
of the US Special Operations Command
a few years later. (Senators Nunn and Cohen
later coauthored the text of the Defense Appropriations
Act of 1986 that established the new US
Special Operations Command.)
The House Armed Services Committee conducted
hearings during May, and the principle
commanders were again called to testify. Guidry
also testified before the House committee. House
representatives seemed fixed on determining why
the RH-53D helicopter was selected for the
mission over perhaps other, more capable aircraft
(the USAF MH-53 Pave Low, for example). After
two weeks of testimony on Capitol Hill, Congress
decided to drop its investigation and turn the
task over to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Congress
apparently decided that the Joint Chiefs could
better investigate itself to determine what went
wrong. Towards the end of May 1980, the Department
of Defense established the Special Operations
Review Group, which came to be known
as the Holloway Commission and was chaired
by Adm James L. Holloway III, former chief of
nava l operations. The commission was chartered
to conduct a forward-looking, no-holdsbarred
assessment of the attempted rescue mis -
sion. The purpose of the commission was to
provide an independent appraisal of the rescue
attempt so the commission could recommend improvements
in planning, organizing, coordinating,
directing, and controlling any similar operation in
the future. 150
The commission was made up of six flag and
general officers representing all four services. In
addition to its chairman (Admiral Holloway),
members of the commission included Lt Gen
Samuel V. Wilson, Retired, USA; Lt Gen Leroy J.
Manor, Retired, USAF; Maj Gen James C. Smith,
USA; Maj Gen John L. Piotrowski, USAF; and
Maj Gen Alfred M. Gray, USMC. 151 The group reviewed
all pertinent written documentation, including
planning documents, training reports,
mission debriefs, congressional testimony, media
clips, press releases, technical analyses, and the
after action report. All principals involved in the
operation were also interviewed. The commission
traveled to Fort Bragg and to Hurlburt Field and
received detailed briefings on each participating
unit’s capabilities. At Hurlburt Field an airfield
seizure demonstration was conducted with Brenci’s
and Meller’s crews performing blacked-out landings
at Holley Field, a small airfield located in the
Florida Panhandle. The short runways and confined
taxiways challenged the participants, but
the demonstration went off without a hitch. Two
HH-53 Pave Low helicopters from the 20th SOS
and one AC-130H gunship from the 16th SOS also
participated in the demonstration. In addition to
viewing actual demonstrations and receiving mission
briefings, the commission also conducted
roundtable discussions with mission personnel of
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