1 - The Black Vault

ESTABLISHMENT OF COMBAT TALON
Two days before the surrender of the Japanese
in the Pacific, the Soviet Union declared war on
Japan and marched into Manchuria and northern
Korea. The Soviet Union took the United States
by surprise with its swift action; therefore, the
United States hastily proposed that Soviet forces
accept surrender of the Japanese north of the
38th parallel, saying that the United States
would accept surrender south of that point. US
leaders reasoned that elections would be held in
the near future to determine the makeup of
post–World War II Asia, including Korea. The Soviets
readily accepted the proposal, but free elections
never were held, thus setting the stage for a
future conflict on the Korean peninsula.
Throughout the remainder of 1945 and into
1946, the United States demobilized its air, land,
and naval forces that had fought and won World
War II. The United States had not historically
maintained a large standing military during
peacetime. With demands placed on the United
States to rebuild Europe and Japan, US demobilization
seemed the right course of action. The
one miscalculation made by the United States
was the Soviet Union’s dogged determination to
expand communism through world dominance.
The resultant cold war was not recognized in its
early stages for what it actually was—a war. Not
until the summer of 1950, when the North Korean
Peoples Army (NKPA)—trained and equipped by
the Soviet Union and communist China—invaded
South Korea, did this miscalculation come to
light.
With the disbanding of the OSS in 1945, the
National Security Council (NSC) was tasked with
covert and clandestine operations and established
infrastructure and organizational responsibility
for carrying out those operations. The National Security
Act of 1947 established the National Security
Council and the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) as independent agencies responsible for collecting
intelligence affecting the national security
of the United States. During peacetime the CIA
was designated the primary agency for conducting
covert and clandestine actions. In times of war, the
Department of Defense (DOD) had primary responsibility,
but there was a great deal of undefined
areas, which would inevitably cause conflict
between the two civilian and military organiza -
tions. From 1947 to 1954, NSC directives outlined
when either DOD or the CIA was responsible for
these actions. 20
When the NKPA invaded Korea on 25 June
1950, DOD and CIA relationships were still in
their infancy. As a result, military, CIA, and
South Korean unconventional warfare (UW) efforts
in Korea were uncoordinated and disjointed
from the outset. The initial organization set up to
manage UW efforts in Korea was known as the
Far East Command (FECOM) “Liaison Group,” or
FEC/LG. This staff organization was FECOM’s
link to intelligence and partisan organizations controlled
by DOD and CIA case officers. The CIA
was an independent civilian organization and, as
such, guarded its independence from the military
establishment. The reluctance to cooperate between
these two organizations doomed FEC/LG.
By late fall the FECOM commander, Gen Douglas
MacArthur, sought to create an organization tasked
to centralize control of all UW activities and to develop
a UW-coordinated plan. The classified title for
the new organization was Covert, Clandestine, and
Related Activities—Korea (CCRACK) and was located
in downtown Seoul. Its unclassified title
was the “Combined Command for Reconnaissance
Activities—Korea.” CCRAK (pronounced see
crack) was a joint organization made up of both
military and CIA personnel. The CIA division of
CCRAK was entitled the “Joint Activities Commission,
Korea (JACK).” The director of CCRAK
was a military officer who was appointed by FE-
COM; the deputy director was a civilian CIA officer
who was also the director of JACK. As was the
case for FEC/LG, cooperation between the military
and CIA civilians was voluntary within the organization.
The CIA would not relinquish its independence
to a military boss. As the war progressed,
this ad hoc organizational structure
would impact CCRAK’s ability to accomplish its
mission in an effective and efficient manner. 21
FEC/LG, and later CCRAK, required air support
to infiltrate its agents behind the lines just as
the OSS had required during World War II. To
facilitate airborne infiltration of these agents, Unit
4 of the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron (TCS) was
established at Taegu Airfield (K-2) in southern
Korea in late July 1950. On 26 September 1950
two C-47s from Unit 4 accomplished the first of
many infiltration missions by air-dropping nine
agents behind the retreating NKPA. All landed
safely and were later exfiltrated by foot to report
NKPA movements. 22 After the United Nation (UN)
breakout from the Pusan perimeter and the landing
of General MacArthur’s forces at Inchon, Unit
4 moved forward to Kimpo Airfield (K-14), located
just outside Seoul. For the next three months,
CCRAK missions were flown deep into northern
Korea from K-14. Chinese forces invaded Korea
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