1 - The Black Vault

FROM DESERT ONE TO POINT SALINES
through Phase III objectives had been met. Phase
IV, which included the establishment of a civilian
government in Grenada, would continue throughout
the remainder of the year.
Lessons Learned
Operation Urgent Fury was a success, having
attained its military objectives during the period
from 25 October to 2 November. For special operations
and the entire military community, how -
ever, weaknesses in command and control were
highlighted. CJTF-120 was made up of four sepa -
rate task forces, and these task forces were not
colocated and could not readily communicate
among each other nor with CJTF-120. Airlift and
tanker forces were not OPCON to the CJTF but
rather responded to tasking through JCS. Each
TF had aircraft committed to it, but no single air
manager was designated. The CJTF arrangement
resulted in piecemeal control of forces and uncertainties
as to specific areas of responsibility. From
an Air Force perspective, the constant flux in
force composition caused significant difficulties
for air planners in determining requirements and
assessing employment capabilities and options.
Operation Urgent Fury also did not use an existing
plan as the basis of the operation. If it had
used an existing plan, it might have avoided some
of the confusion. A contingency plan was in existence,
which covered the type of operation faced in
Grenada, and it had been practiced in joint exercises
before Operation Urgent Fury. The decision
was made not to use the plan, which effectively
meant that the operation started from a no-plan
status. Command difficulties also were experienced
on the ground, with General Schwarzkopf
acting in an advisory role during the first two
days of the operation. He eventually was designated
as Vice Admiral Metcalf’s deputy commander,
which cleared up some confusion in the
chain of command.
The short notice of the operation did not allow
Combat Talon sufficient time to plan and “what if”
the plan before execution. Because of the need to
react quickly and decisively to the threat, a rehearsal
of the airfield seizure operation was not
possible. Had a rehearsal been conducted, weaknesses
in the plan (i.e., an abort en route or systems
failure that precluded planned drop sequencing)
could have been more thoroughly addressed
and provisions made for rapid adjustments. There
were also not enough Combat Talons to perform
the mission. Only five aircraft were available at
Hurlburt Field from the 8th SOS, and all five were
committed to the Point Salines airfield assault. A
sixth Combat Talon was hastily deployed from
Europe to serve as a spare for the mission. Additional
SOLL II C-130s were used in combination
with the Talons so that adequate numbers of special
operations forces could be infiltrated on to the
airfield. In all, five Combat Talons and seven
SOLL II C-130s transported rangers into Point Salines.
Had there been sufficient numbers of Talons
to support the mission, there would not have been
a requirement for SOLL II augmentation. As had
been the case three years earlier at Desert One,
the weather played a major part in the success of
the assault. Postmission analysis pointed to the
fact that the ability to forecast accurate weather
information was critical to mission success.
The weaknesses in executing a joint operation
did not go unnoticed by Congress. Within three
years, in the Goldwater–Nichols Defense Reorganization
Act of 1986, Congress created the US Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM), which was
tasked to organize and train a special operations
force made up of soldiers, airmen, and sailors from
the three services. USSOCOM would trace its roots
back to the OSS of World War II, and Combat Talon
would become a key player in the new command.
Notes
1. History, 7th Special Operations Squadron, 1 April–30
June 1980, USAF HRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., supporting document
11, 5.
2. Ibid ., 3 .
3. Ibid., iv.
4. Ibid., 8.
5. History, 7th Special Operations Squadron, 1 October–31
December 1980, 18.
6. History, 8th Special Operations Squadron, 1 October–31
December 1980, 16th Special Operations Wing historian file,
Hurlburt Field, Fla.
7. History, 7th Special Operations Squadron, 1 April–30
June 1981, 1–2.
8. History, 8th Special Operations Squadron, 1 January–
31 March 1981.
9. History, 7th Special Operations Squadron, 1 April–30
June 1981, 13, 21.
10. History, 1st Special Operations Wing, 1 April–30 June
1981, 16th Special Operations Wing historian file, Hurlburt
Field, Fla., vol. 1, II-37 to II-39.
11. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 April–30
June 1981, Combat Talon Archive, HQ AFSOC/HO, Hurlburt
Field, Fla., supporting document 4, D4-3 to D4-5.
12. Ibid., 11.
13. History, 1st Special Operations Squadron, 1 July–30
September 1981, 11.
287