1 - The Black Vault

THE IRANIAN RESCUE MISSION
helicopters. The exercise did validate that the
JTF had a viable in-extremist means to get fuel to
the helicopters. After the airdrop, the AC-130H
gunship put on a dazzling show for the JTF that
demonstrated the aircraft’s ability to provide sustained
and accurate fire in support of the ground
force commander. From that time forward, the
gunship became an integral part of the force package
that Beckwith would require to ensure protection
during the embassy takedown. 32
The afternoon after the second airdrop, unknown
and unplanned by Kyle, a C-141 landed at
Davis-Monthan AFB and unloaded a Vietnam-era
fuel bladder designed to be carried by the C-130
aircraft. The 3,000-gallon bladder could hold
20,000 pounds of fuel, but it was not capable of
being air-dropped. It resembled a huge rubber
water bed that was strapped inside the fuselage of
the aircraft and covered almost the entire cargo
floor. Kyle soon learned that J-3 SOD had sent
the bladder out to be evaluated by the JTF. The
8th SOS loadmasters were again consulted by
Kyle, and in short order the bladder system was
loaded on to an aircraft, and a fuel truck was
called. After several refueling pauses to tighten
fittings that had worked loose over the years, the
bladder was filled, and a short flight was conducted
to test its airworthiness. The flight was
uneventful, with the aircraft landing back at
Davis-Monthan AFB. Since the bladder could not
be air-dropped, an airlanding somewhere in Iran
would be required if the system were to be used,
and hoses and pumps were needed to connect the
bladder to the helicopters. As the Combat Talons
deployed back to their home station on 9 December,
there seemed to be more questions about
Night One than there were before the exercise.
Beckwith was convinced that air-dropping blivets
posed too many variables that could delay or prevent
helicopter refueling. One thing was for
sure—to utilize the bladder system, a site would
have to be found in Iran that allowed the heavy
C-130 to land and refuel the helicopters. 33
By the second week in December, JTF planning
for the rescue attempt was moving at a frantic
pace. Six RH-53D Sea Stallion helicopters had
been slipped aboard the USS Kitty Hawk as it
steamed past Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.
(The aircraft were later transferred to the USS
Nimitz .) The plan had not been finalized, but
everyone agreed that whatever operation was
undertaken to free the hostages would include
helicopters. 34 At Hurlburt Field the arrangement
between Brenci and Smith was becoming
unworkable. As a primary crew member on the
Talon rescue force, Brenci was flying at night and
in crew rest during the day and at times was on
temporary duty away from Hurlburt Field. Critical
coordination had to take place during periods
when Brenci was not available. An awkward situation
also had developed in the 8th SOS since
Brenci had been selected to be the squadron point
of contact—Lt Col Roland Guidry, the squadron
commander of the 8th SOS, had not been read
into the operation! Thus, as the two Combat
Talon crews developed NVG blacked-out procedures
and began CDS delivery of the fuel blivets,
Guidry did not have a “need to know” about the
operation and was “officially” unaware of his
squadron’s training initiatives.
Guidry was new to the Combat Talon in November
1979, having taken command of the
squadron the previous summer. He had not
flown operationally for the previous eight years
and was required to complete the formal Combat
Talon School before being certified in the
aircraft. He was not entirely new to special operations,
however. His assignment before coming
to the 8th SOS had been to the Tactical Air
Warfare Center at Eglin AFB. There he was responsible,
among his other duties, for the test
and evaluation of the CRRC, a project that the
8th SOS had completed in 1978. As the test director,
Guidry had worked with 8th SOS and
1st SOW personnel and had a working knowledge
of the wing. When Ninth AF looked for a
new commander AS the incumbent (Colonel
Hunter) neared the end of his time in command,
Guidry was chosen to lead the squadron. In late
November 1979 Guidry was still in Combat
Talon School and was not certified in the MC-
130E. For these reasons, Les Smith went to
Brenci as his point of contact for the squadron.
As chief pilot, Brenci was in a position to assess
his pilots’ abilities as he selected crews for the
mission.
By 9 December, with the Yuma blivet drops
completed, it was apparent that the number of
personnel at Hurlburt Field read into the plan
had to be increased. Kyle was aware of the situation
with Guidry and elected to meet with him
personally and brief him on the mission. After
talking with Guidry and assessing his ability to successfully
coordinate mission preparations at
Hurlburt Field, Kyle put him in charge of the
Hurlburt MC-130E operation. 35 Guidry proved to
be a highly skilled technician who meticulously
prepared the squadron for every event leading up
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