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Potential Theistic Explanations 91 here it is not clear that God is required to realise that means.” 35 So Garcia admits that there may be an optimal divine action, but denies that God is obliged to follow it. Now if we remember that the optimality condition is an expression of the rationality principle, this argument seems an odd one. For it suggests that God is not obliged to act rationally. And I’m not sure what to make of that idea. Would any theist wish to affi rm that God has acted irrationally? In any case, in the present context the objection is misplaced. The optimality condition is not intended to be a constraint on God; it is intended to be a constraint on us. More precisely, it is a constraint on the offering of theistic explanations. The point is not that God is obliged to do this or that, but that we are obliged, by the nature of intentional explanations, to regard the divine agent as a rational agent. My argument in favour of the optimality condition is epistemological, not metaphysical (or theological). One might want to take it further, to argue that God is obliged to act optimally. But this would be a different argument. The optimality condition I am advocating stems from the nature of intentional explanations, not from any theological claim. 5.4.2 There Is No Optimal Divine Action A second objection relates to the optimality condition itself. Let’s accept that we must regard God as a rational being, who chooses the best possible way of realizing his intentions. We still have to make sense of the idea of the optimal realization of a divine intention. This idea resembles that of a best possible world, to which it is closely related. For the optimality condition entails that if this world is created by God, then it is the best possible realization of whatever intentions God had in creating. It follows that it is the best possible world, although (as we shall see) in a more clearly specifi ed sense. But the diffi culties surrounding the idea of a best possible world are now widely recognised. Could the same objections not be levelled at my idea of an optimal realization of a divine plan? 5.4.2.1 No Best Possible World There are two major objections to the idea of a best possible world. The fi rst is that there may be no “single scale of value” against which different possible worlds could be ranked. 36 After all, there are many different sorts of values. How are they to be compared? “Some world A might be better than rival world B in some respects, but with B surpassing A in others, and the relevant values not such that they could be summed over and compared overall.” 37 The second is that such values may have no upper limit. If we are speaking of mere “additive value,” in the sense that a world with n + 1 creatures is better than a world with n creatures, then there is clearly no limit to how good a world could be. 38 The same may be said of the value
92 Theism and Explanation of diversity, in the sense of the range of natural kinds which a world could contain. For any world, there could be another displaying a greater diversity. What if we were to say that the best world is one which contains the best kinds of beings, those which exhibited the highest level of perfection? Here, too, it seems there is no upper limit. “For each level of fi nite goodness or knowledge” such beings might have, “there is always a higher level.” 39 So it may be that the very idea of a best possible world is incoherent. Can the same not be said of the idea of the optimal realization of a divine plan? 5.4.2.2 Four Responses This is a serious objection. What responses might I offer, in defence of my optima lity condition? Can that condition be defended? Does it rest on an idea that turns out to be incoherent: the idea of a best possible world? The incoherence of theism. A fi rst response would be to come out of the corner fi ghting, for it may be that this objection can be turned against the theist. After all, my optimality condition seems a plausible one. Surely we would expect an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect creator to create the best possible world? And if he has a plan for the world, we would expect him to implement that plan in the best possible way. If the idea of a best possible world, or the best possible implementation of a divine plan, is an incoherent one, so much the worse for the theist. If there is nothing wrong with the logic of this argument, then the incoher ence of the conclusion refl ects an incoherence in its premises. What is at fault, it could be argued, is the very idea of God. What the argument shows is that there cannot be a being who is omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect. Even to speak of God as “perfectly good” would be to fall into confusion; it is as if we were to speak of something as “perfectly long.” 40 I spoke earlier (3.3) about the idea that theism may be disqualifi ed as a hypothesis because it is incoherent. This is one way in which that argument could be pursued. There is no parallel. However, I shall not pursue that fi rst response here. Instead, I shall offer a second response. I shall argue that the idea of an optimal realization of a divine plan is not faced with the same objections that can be brought against the idea of a best possible world. As we have seen, the idea of a best possible world is problematic because of the diversity of the values that must be compared and the fact that those values have no upper limit. But the idea of an optimal realization of a divine plan faces neither of these diffi culties. The optimality in question is more clearly defi ned: it is “best relative to the ends and purposes one has in mind.” 41 And while the optimality condition may entail that a world created by God would be the best possible world—although once again in a more clearly defi ned sense—the two ideas are not identical. The optimality condition is not something one applies to the world as a whole. Indeed it is not clear, at
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Theism and Explanation
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Theism and Explanation Gregory W. D
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To Anna who never tires of asking
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Acknowledgements My thanks are due
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2 Theism and Explanation Could it m
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4 Theism and Explanation While I ho
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6 Theism and Explanation experiment
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8 Theism and Explanation Plantinga
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10 Theism and Explanation explanati
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12 Theism and Explanation by refere
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14 Theism and Explanation explanati
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16 Theism and Explanation God creat
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2 On Explanations in General “Exp
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On Explanations in General 21 of ou
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On Explanations in General 23 merel
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Figure 2.2 Swinburne’s conception
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On Explanations in General 27 simil
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On Explanations in General 29 condi
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On Explanations in General 31 could
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3 What are Theistic Explanations? I
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What are Theistic Explanations? 35
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Page 112 and 113: 6 Inference to the Best Explanation
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Successful Theistic Explanations 14
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8 Conclusion Miss Binney spoke as i
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Conclusion 145 explanation that met
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Appendix Intentional Explanations M
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Appendix 149 attend any discussion
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Appendix 151 explanation is a causa
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Appendix 153 we assume is a “myth
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Appendix 155 Will this suffi ce as
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Appendix 157 reasoning, Schueler su
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Appendix 159 action, one that has a
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Appendix 161 estimate of her charac
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Appendix 163 causal laws do exist.
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Appendix 165 this is the explanatio
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Notes NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 1. Numbers
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Notes 169 James Maclaurin has remin
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Notes 171 19. Musgrave, “Scientif
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Notes 173 the most explicit in its
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Notes 175 any true proposition, the
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Notes 177 weaker but to their mind
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Notes 179 15. Hume, “Dialogues,
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Notes 181 19. Swinburne, Is There a
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Notes 183 it will also confi rm H 2
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Notes 185 91. I am grateful to Geor
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Notes 187 this be a fatal objection
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Notes 189 71. Lakatos, “Falsifi c
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192 Bibliography Behe, Michael J. D
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194 Bibliography Dembski, William A
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196 Bibliography . A Treatise of Hu
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198 Bibliography Melnyk, Andrew. A
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200 Bibliography Rundle, Bede. 2004
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Index A abduction: and induction, 1
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defences, and theodicies, 134-35 de
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intelligent design theory: argument
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preemption, causal. See causal pree
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tsunami, Boxing Day, 60, 61, 68, 14
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