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Inference to the Best Explanation 109 (1) The surprising fact, E, is observed. (2) But if H were true, E would be a matter of course. (3) Therefore H is true. Such an argument would embody a well-known logical fallacy, namely that of affi rming the consequent. 38 It is a fallacy of the The streets are wet; if it has been raining, the streets would be wet; therefore it has been raining variety. In symbols, the argument involved would have the following, invalid form. P ⊃ Q Q ∴ P If this is how we justify our belief in unobservables, then A. J. Ayer was surely right: the inference involved is illegitimate. 39 Let me illustrate the diffi culty. I suggested earlier (3.1) that the discovery of electrons was a scientifi c discovery backed up by abductive reasoning. One of the factors that led to the discovery of electrons was the attempt to explain the behaviour of cathode rays. In particular, J. J. Thomson suggested that the behaviour of cathode rays could be understood if we assume that they “mark the paths of particles of matter charged with negative electricity.” 40 But the danger with such reasoning is that there are other ways in which cathode rays could be explained. In fact, in Thomson’s day there was a competing hypothesis, namely that of “some process in the aether.” 41 I shall refl ect later on how Thomson chose between these competing hypotheses, in order to argue that the electron hypothesis was the better explanation (7.1). For the moment, I want to note merely that the electron hypothesis was not the only potential explanation of the data. And even if it were, Thomson could not have excluded the possibility that another, preferable explanation existed. The general principle should be clear. The mere fact that some hypothesis would explain the data, if it were true, does not entail that it is true. As Alan Musgrave writes, “any sane philosopher can think of countless cases where an explanation of some surprising fact is false. It is a surprising fact that fossils are found on mountain tops. One explanation is that Martians came and put them there to surprise us. But this explanation is not true.” 42 What makes us think the Martian hypothesis is not true? It is the fact that we have a better explanation. So perhaps we can reformulate Peirce’s abductive schema as a form of inference to the best explanation (IBE). (1) The surprising fact, E, is observed. (2) If H were true, E would be a matter of course. (3) No available competing hypothesis would explain E as well as H does. (4) Therefore H is true.
110 Theism and Explanation Does this solve our problem? No it does not. I have already explored this line of argument when discussing scientifi c realism (3.1.2) and found it wanting. The problem with this schema is—as Musgrave writes—that it is merely “a souped up version of the fallacy of affi rming the consequent.” 43 It assumes that the best available explanation of some fact is the true one. And as van Fraassen has reminded us (3.1.1), this assumption is indefensible: the best explanation available may well be a false one. So the fact that it is the best explanation cannot warrant the conclusion that it is true. Could it warrant a weaker conclusion, not about the truth of H, but about the rationality of accepting H? Our revised Peircean schema, which adds a premise (4), would take the following form. 44 (1) The surprising fact, E, is observed. (2) If H were true, E would be a matter of course. (3) No available competing hypothesis would explain E as well as H does. (4) It is reasonable to accept the best available potential explanation of any fact. (5) Therefore it is reasonable to accept H. As I suggested earlier (3.1.2), this argument is defensible, at least if we carefully defi ne what we mean by “accept.” Its key principle is premise (4), the claim that it is reasonable to accept the best available explanation of any fact. This is not defeated by the observation that the best available explanation may turn out to be false. For it may be reasonable to accept a falsehood, provided (of course) that one does not know it is false. Many late medieval Europeans accepted the geocentric view of the universe put forward by Ptolemy (ca. ad 100–170). Does the fact that Ptolemy’s cosmology was false make this an irrational choice? No, it does not. For until the work of Nicolaus Copernicus (1473–1543), Ptolemy’s cosmology was the best available explanation of the movements of the heavenly bodies. 45 Indeed before the arrival of the Copernican hypothesis, it may have been irrational to accept any other explanation of the movement of the heavens. 6.2.2 The Best Explanation If we adopt my revised Peircean schema, then a key question is: By what criteria do we judge H to be the best explanation of E? It is important to note that a parallel question may be asked if H is the only explanation on offer. For even if it has no rivals, we still want H to possess those features by which we might judge it to be the best explanation, if it had competitors. In Musgrave’s words, we would like H to be a “satisfactory” explanation of E. 46 This is an important point for the evaluation of proposed theistic explanations, for it means they do not win by default. If the only
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Theism and Explanation
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Theism and Explanation Gregory W. D
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To Anna who never tires of asking
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Acknowledgements My thanks are due
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2 Theism and Explanation Could it m
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6 Theism and Explanation experiment
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On Explanations in General 21 of ou
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On Explanations in General 23 merel
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Figure 2.2 Swinburne’s conception
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On Explanations in General 27 simil
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On Explanations in General 29 condi
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3 What are Theistic Explanations? I
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What are Theistic Explanations? 35
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3.2.2 Positing a Divine Agent What
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Page 112 and 113: 6 Inference to the Best Explanation
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Page 156 and 157: Conclusion 145 explanation that met
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Page 160 and 161: Appendix 149 attend any discussion
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Appendix 159 action, one that has a
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Appendix 161 estimate of her charac
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Appendix 163 causal laws do exist.
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Appendix 165 this is the explanatio
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Notes NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 1. Numbers
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Notes 169 James Maclaurin has remin
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Notes 171 19. Musgrave, “Scientif
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Notes 173 the most explicit in its
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Notes 175 any true proposition, the
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Notes 177 weaker but to their mind
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Notes 179 15. Hume, “Dialogues,
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Notes 181 19. Swinburne, Is There a
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Notes 183 it will also confi rm H 2
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Notes 185 91. I am grateful to Geor
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Notes 187 this be a fatal objection
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Notes 189 71. Lakatos, “Falsifi c
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192 Bibliography Behe, Michael J. D
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194 Bibliography Dembski, William A
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196 Bibliography . A Treatise of Hu
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198 Bibliography Melnyk, Andrew. A
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200 Bibliography Rundle, Bede. 2004
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Index A abduction: and induction, 1
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defences, and theodicies, 134-35 de
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intelligent design theory: argument
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preemption, causal. See causal pree
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tsunami, Boxing Day, 60, 61, 68, 14
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