Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

26 Theism and Explanation
carry-over from the statistical use of the term. 33 Howard Sobel rejects Swinburne’s
idea of logical probability, arguing that the only probabilities one
can speak of in this context are measures of the degree to which actual
individuals are confi dent about their beliefs. 34 And Timothy McGrew
argues that Swinburne’s defi nition of logical probability merely plays into
the hands of the sceptic, by setting our standards for justifi ed belief impossibly
high. 35
So there are diffi culties facing the use of confi rmation theory in the context
of a proposed theistic explanation. But while I believe they are serious
diffi culties, I do not intend to pursue them here. In Chapter 7, I shall be
outlining my own criteria of theory choice, which include degree of testability,
simplicity, economy, and fi t with background knowledge. But my
preferred notion of simplicity (7.4) differs from Swinburne’s, and I shall not
be using these criteria in order to estimate probabilities. For reasons that
will become clear in a moment (2.1.3.2), my reconstruction of proposed
religious explanations will make no use of confi rmation theory. And in discussing
the work of those theists who do appeal to probability arguments,
I shall simply assume that they have some answer to these objections. After
all, these are not objections to religious explanations in particular; they
are objections to a particular way of defending explanations in general.
But as I hope to show, it is not the only way in which explanations could
be defended.
2.1.3.2 Explanationism
One of the factors that makes me reluctant to embrace confi rmation theory
in this context is that it simply sets the bar too high. It uses a higher standard
for the acceptance of a theistic hypothesis than is actually applied
within the sciences. There are a number of senses in which scientists can
be said to “accept” theories, 36 but let me take a relatively strong sense of
this term. Let me say that a scientist accepts a theory when he begins working
within the framework it provides and abandons alternative approaches.
There are occasions when scientists have accepted a theory (in this sense)
when that theory has not yet been shown to be even probably true. 37 Yet we
may judge that they were acting rationally in doing so.
Let me take as an example Darwin’s theory, at the moment of its introduction
in 1859. If it was worthy of acceptance (and we can be grateful
some people considered it so), was it because its posterior probability had
been shown to be greater than 0.5? John Earman, at least, thinks not.
He argues that given the diffi culties facing the theory at the time of its
introduction, 38 it had a low posterior probability. 39 Darwin himself was
very aware of the diffi culties facing his theory. At times he seems to be
arguing for a relatively modest position—not that his theory of natural
selection was probably true, but that it was what Barry Gale calls “the
least objectionable theory” on offer. 40 Huxley appears to have offered a