Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

92 Theism and Explanation
of diversity, in the sense of the range of natural kinds which a world could
contain. For any world, there could be another displaying a greater diversity.
What if we were to say that the best world is one which contains the
best kinds of beings, those which exhibited the highest level of perfection?
Here, too, it seems there is no upper limit. “For each level of fi nite goodness
or knowledge” such beings might have, “there is always a higher level.” 39 So
it may be that the very idea of a best possible world is incoherent. Can the
same not be said of the idea of the optimal realization of a divine plan?
5.4.2.2 Four Responses
This is a serious objection. What responses might I offer, in defence of my
optima lity condition? Can that condition be defended? Does it rest on an
idea that turns out to be incoherent: the idea of a best possible world?
The incoherence of theism. A fi rst response would be to come out of the
corner fi ghting, for it may be that this objection can be turned against the
theist. After all, my optimality condition seems a plausible one. Surely we
would expect an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect creator to
create the best possible world? And if he has a plan for the world, we would
expect him to implement that plan in the best possible way. If the idea of a
best possible world, or the best possible implementation of a divine plan,
is an incoherent one, so much the worse for the theist. If there is nothing
wrong with the logic of this argument, then the incoher ence of the conclusion
refl ects an incoherence in its premises. What is at fault, it could be
argued, is the very idea of God. What the argument shows is that there cannot
be a being who is omniscient, omnipotent, and morally perfect. Even
to speak of God as “perfectly good” would be to fall into confusion; it is as
if we were to speak of something as “perfectly long.” 40 I spoke earlier (3.3)
about the idea that theism may be disqualifi ed as a hypothesis because it is
incoherent. This is one way in which that argument could be pursued.
There is no parallel. However, I shall not pursue that fi rst response here.
Instead, I shall offer a second response. I shall argue that the idea of an
optimal realization of a divine plan is not faced with the same objections
that can be brought against the idea of a best possible world. As we have
seen, the idea of a best possible world is problematic because of the diversity
of the values that must be compared and the fact that those values
have no upper limit. But the idea of an optimal realization of a divine plan
faces neither of these diffi culties. The optimality in question is more clearly
defi ned: it is “best relative to the ends and purposes one has in mind.” 41
And while the optimality condition may entail that a world created by God
would be the best possible world—although once again in a more clearly
defi ned sense—the two ideas are not identical. The optimality condition is
not something one applies to the world as a whole. Indeed it is not clear, at