Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

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Successful Theistic Explanations 119 (1) There exists a divine agent with goal G. (2) E is the best means of achieving G. (3) A divine agent will always choose the best means of achieving G. (4) Therefore the divine agent will do E. Swinburne does want to argue that if the theistic hypothesis H were true, E would be what we would expect to observe. More formally, he wishes to argue that Pr(E|H) > Pr(E|H). But his argument in support of this conclusion amounts to little more than the following. (1) There exists a divine agent with expected goals G 1 . . . G 5 . (2) One of G 1 . . . G 5 would lead God to produce E. (3) Therefore E. This may be true, but this doesn’t tell us very much. And it is not independently testable. Why not? Well, there are two elements missing from Swinburne’s reasoning, corresponding to the two premises of the argument I have attributed to him. The fi rst is a specifi cation of the particular goal (G) that God is meant to be pursuing here. (This is what I mean by a lack of intentional specifi city.) It is only when you have specifi ed the divine intention in question that we can test your explanation, by asking what else would follow if God did indeed have this intention. And as we have seen (3.2.3), it will not do merely to substitute the explanandum for the posited goal (substituting E for G). As we have already seen, this would be a spurious kind of explanation, seriously lacking in empirical content. The second feature that Swinburne’s proposed explanations lack is a demonstration that pursuing goal G would lead God to bring about E. In the absence of laws of divine behaviour—in the absence of laws of intentional behaviour generally—I have suggested that what we should employ here is the rationality principle (5.2). We need to show that E represents the best way of bringing about goal G. But Swinburne’s proposed explanations make no reference to either behavioural laws or the rationality principle. As a result, they lack a meaningful constraint. He may be right to suggest that this is how God would act, given these posited goals, but he gives us no reasoning that would support his conclusion. 7.1.2 Prediction and Retrodiction I have spoken of a hypothesis being corroborated by successful predictions. But the term “prediction” is ambiguous. In its strict sense, it refers
120 Theism and Explanation to the deduction of hitherto unobserved facts. When Albert Michelson and Edward Morley set up their famous experiment in 1887, they did not yet know what its outcome would be. All they knew is that if there were a luminiferous aether, you would expect a difference in the speed of light when measured parallel to and at right angles to the movement of the earth through the aether. Their failure to observe this difference constituted strong evidence against the theory. But the term “prediction” is sometimes used in a looser sense. We have seen that to test his theory of the electron, J. J. Thomson “predicted” that if cathode rays were negatively charged particles, they would carry their charge into an enclosure. But he already knew the outcome of the experiment that tested the prediction, which had been performed in 1895 by Jean Perrin. 9 The Popperian view. The question that arises here is: Do we need successful “predictions” in the strict sense of that word? That is to say, is it necessary that the confi rming observation should occur only after the formulation of our hypothesis? Could a theory be corroborated by facts that are already known? A strictly Popperian view of testability denies this; it insists that the facts that corroborate a theory must be previously unknown. For Popper, what counts is a severe test, and a severe test of a theory is one whose outcome is unlikely to be observed, given background knowledge alone. 10 A theory is corroborated insofar as it has passed severe tests. But if the outcome of the test is already part of our background knowledge, then a “prediction” of that outcome can hardly constitute a severe test. The problem with the Popperian view is one at which I have already hinted. It is simply too demanding, given actual scientifi c practice. As John Worrall points out, the facts concerning the perihelion of Mercury—the rate at which its elliptical orbit around the sun rotates—were known well in advance of Einstein’s theory of general relativity. (The apparent anomaly here, on a Newtonian view, had been noted as early as 1859.) But the fact that Einstein’s physics could explain this movement while Newton’s could not has generally been taken as evidence in support of general relativity. 11 On a Popperian view, this conclusion would be illegitimate. 12 In addition to this, there appear to be good theoretical reasons to allow a theory to be corroborated by known facts. After all, it could be argued, what matters when we are testing a theory is that its consequences are true. If the evidence shows that some consequence of a theory is true, then this cannot depend on whether the evidence came to be known before the theory was proposed or afterwards. Such historical considerations, interesting as they may be, ought not to affect questions of confi rmation or evidential support. 13 So on logical grounds alone, it would seem reasonable to allow a theory to be corroborated by facts that are already known.
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Theism and Explanation
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Theism and Explanation Gregory W. D
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To Anna who never tires of asking
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Acknowledgements My thanks are due
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2 Theism and Explanation Could it m
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4 Theism and Explanation While I ho
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6 Theism and Explanation experiment
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8 Theism and Explanation Plantinga
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10 Theism and Explanation explanati
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12 Theism and Explanation by refere
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14 Theism and Explanation explanati
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16 Theism and Explanation God creat
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2 On Explanations in General “Exp
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On Explanations in General 21 of ou
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On Explanations in General 23 merel
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Figure 2.2 Swinburne’s conception
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On Explanations in General 27 simil
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On Explanations in General 29 condi
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On Explanations in General 31 could
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3 What are Theistic Explanations? I
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What are Theistic Explanations? 35
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3.2.2 Positing a Divine Agent What
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4 What Would They Explain? It’s a
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4.2 SINGULAR AND GENERAL EXPLANATIO
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What Would They Explain? 63 shelter
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What Would They Explain? 65 were we
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What Would They Explain? 67 not des
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Page 89 and 90: 78 Theism and Explanation contradic
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Page 93 and 94: 82 Theism and Explanation 5.1.3 Is
Page 95 and 96: 84 Theism and Explanation eye. But
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Page 99 and 100: 88 Theism and Explanation Why not,
Page 101 and 102: 90 Theism and Explanation directly,
Page 103 and 104: 92 Theism and Explanation of divers
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Page 107 and 108: 96 Theism and Explanation already c
Page 109 and 110: 98 Theism and Explanation (2.1.2) t
Page 112 and 113: 6 Inference to the Best Explanation
Page 114 and 115: Inference to the Best Explanation 1
Page 126 and 127: 7 Successful Theistic Explanations
Page 128 and 129: Successful Theistic Explanations 11
Page 154 and 155: 8 Conclusion Miss Binney spoke as i
Page 156 and 157: Conclusion 145 explanation that met
Page 158 and 159: Appendix Intentional Explanations M
Page 160 and 161: Appendix 149 attend any discussion
Page 162 and 163: Appendix 151 explanation is a causa
Page 164 and 165: Appendix 153 we assume is a “myth
Page 166 and 167: Appendix 155 Will this suffi ce as
Page 168 and 169: Appendix 157 reasoning, Schueler su
Page 170 and 171: Appendix 159 action, one that has a
Page 172 and 173: Appendix 161 estimate of her charac
Page 174 and 175: Appendix 163 causal laws do exist.
Page 176 and 177: Appendix 165 this is the explanatio
Page 178 and 179: Notes NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 1. Numbers
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Notes 169 James Maclaurin has remin
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Notes 171 19. Musgrave, “Scientif
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Notes 173 the most explicit in its
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Notes 175 any true proposition, the
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Notes 177 weaker but to their mind
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Notes 179 15. Hume, “Dialogues,
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Notes 181 19. Swinburne, Is There a
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Notes 183 it will also confi rm H 2
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Notes 185 91. I am grateful to Geor
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Notes 187 this be a fatal objection
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Notes 189 71. Lakatos, “Falsifi c
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192 Bibliography Behe, Michael J. D
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194 Bibliography Dembski, William A
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196 Bibliography . A Treatise of Hu
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198 Bibliography Melnyk, Andrew. A
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200 Bibliography Rundle, Bede. 2004
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Index A abduction: and induction, 1
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defences, and theodicies, 134-35 de
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intelligent design theory: argument
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preemption, causal. See causal pree
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tsunami, Boxing Day, 60, 61, 68, 14
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