Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

Inference to the Best Explanation 113
might judge it to be the best, if it had competitors. I have just argued (6.2.1)
that such a policy can be defended against van Fraassen’s objections (3.1.1).
But I have not yet produced any positive arguments in its favour. Can our
use of this policy of theory choice be justifi ed?
William Lycan argues—rightly, it seems to me—that we cannot justify
such a policy. We cannot justify it precisely because its principles are fundamental.
They are the principles by which we justify, which cannot be
justifi ed in turn. Lycan repeatedly cites Jeremy Bentham’s principle in this
context, namely “that which is used to prove everything else . . . cannot
itself be proved.” 51 If we look at instances of theory-choice that we judge,
intuitively, to be rational, we discover that these are the kinds of principles
they employ. 52 So we have reason to think that this is what it means to act
rationally. End of story. For as Lycan writes, “rationality is a primitive
term used to evaluate epistemic acts; particular principles are seen to “tend
toward truth,” because the beliefs they produce are rational, not the other
way around.” 53
But while we cannot offer an epistemic justifi cation of these principles,
we can offer an explanation of why it is that we employ them. Lycan’s
explanation is a broadly evolutionary one, which appeals to the usefulness
of such a procedure.
Crudely, the idea is . . . that it is a good thing in cost-benefi t terms,
that we choose theories on the basis of simplicity and the other explanatory
virtues. Specifi cally, these methods of theory choice are the
ones that a wise and benevolent Mother Nature would have given us,
. . . because our having these methods rather than others has survival
(and welfare) advantage. 54
Once again, to say this is not to argue that such principles are truth-conducive
because they are useful. 55 Rather, it is to explain why we regard
such principles as truth-conducive. In this context, Lycan argues, such an
explanation is the best we can do.
Does it matter if you are not convinced by Lycan’s arguments? Probably
not. For I could also approach this matter in an entirely pragmatic manner,
by referring to the bare fact that these are the criteria we employ. As Lycan
notes, these are the principles that underlie what we regard, intuitively,
as our best scientifi c practice. As a matter of fact, we prefer theories that
have a high degree of testability, and are simple, ontologically economical,
and informative. There are various reasons that can be given for our
having this preference, but the preference itself is not in doubt. So all I
need do is to appeal to this widely-held view, which is also that adopted by
at least some theistic philosophers. For while not all theists present their
arguments for the existence of God as “inference to the best explanation”
arguments, there are some who do. And those who do—thinkers such as