Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

Appendix 155
Will this suffi ce as a description of an intentional explanation? It suffers
from two weaknesses. The fi rst lies in its fi rst premise, which states merely
that the agent has a desire for . I have already argued that having a desire
is not the same as having an intention. The second is that this syllogism
moves from two facts about the agent to a conclusion about what the agent
“should” do. Even if we can clarify what it means to say that the agent
“should” perform action A—in the sense that this is the most reasonable
way for her to act—what we are wanting to explain is the agent’s action.
So ideally our conclusion should describe the action itself, while making it
clear how it fl ows from the premises.
Georg Henrik von Wright offers us a form of practical syllogism that
addresses both of these issues.
(1) A intends to bring about p.
(2) A considers that he cannot bring about p unless he does a.
(3) Therefore A sets himself to do a. 39
Note how this differs from Audi’s schema. The initial premise now posits
an intention rather than a mere desire, while the conclusion is a statement
about the performance of the action in question. It does not merely state
that it is what the agent ought to do. Will this suffi ce as an explanation of
an action? It may be better than Audi’s schema, but it still fails to make it
clear how the action in question follows from the premises. Its conclusion
is introduced by a “therefore,” but what lies behind this “therefore” is not
made explicit. So my preferred form of practical syllogism is the one I outlined
earlier (4.4.3).
(1) There exists a rational agent A with intended goal G.
(2) A has beliefs B 1 , B 2 , . . . B n relating to the attainment of G.
(3) If B 1 , B 2 , . . . B n were true, E would be the best way of achieving G.
(4) Rational agents always choose the best way of achieving their goals.
(5) Therefore A will do E.
This introduces into the discussion the rationality principle upon which, I
have argued, all intentional explanations rest. And it is this rationality principle
which makes explicit the rationale behind the “should A” of Audi’s
formulation and the “therefore” that introduces von Wright’s conclusion.
A.2.2 Explaining the Explanans
On the assumption that an explanation can be complete even if it does not
explain its explanans (1.3.3), then the above syllogism represents an intentional
explanation. Such an explanation posits an agent having a particular
intention, along with a set of relevant beliefs, and shows the explanandum
is how we would expect such an agent to act. But we may, of course, ask a