Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

156 Appendix
further question. We may ask why this agent formed this particular intention.
For an agent possessing a particular set of beliefs and desires may
often have more than one possible reason to act. 40 And those reasons may
be such that, considered individually, they would lead the agent to form
quite different intentions. 41 Take, for instance, the situation in which I form
the intention to accept a job offer in a different city. 42 One could apparently
explain my having this intention by citing those factors which would favour
it. The new position represented a promotion, the university department
to which I am moving is larger and livelier than my present one, the city
to which I am moving has a warmer climate, and so on. The problem is
that there are other factors that would count against my accepting the job.
House prices in this new city are higher, my wife will have to leave her job,
the children will need to move school, and so on. So whether I accepted the
job or refused it, an onlooker could have posited sets of beliefs and desires
that would apparently explain the intention I formed.
What is happening in a case such as this? In this situation, there exists
a variety of possible intentions, a variety of potential reasons for acting,
none of which is irreconcilable with my having the beliefs and desires I
do. If you want to know why I formed the intention I eventually had, then
you will need to explain why I favoured one set of potential reasons rather
than another. Once again, it is important to note that this represents a new
intentional explanation having a new explanandum. Let’s say the original
explanation set out to explain some particular action on my part—perhaps
why my wife and I sold our house. It may have explained this fact by positing
a particular intention—namely, that I intend to take up a job in another
city. That explanation has now done its job. But one can then ask why
I formed this particular intention, and in many situations the answer to
that new question will be far from obvious. So it is worth refl ecting for a
moment on how we might answer it.
My suggestion is this. We can explain why an agent acted on one set of
potential reasons rather than another by forming a new argument, a new
syllogism (if you like), which has a description of the agent’s beliefs and
desires for its premises, and a description of her intention as its conclusion.
What will be distinctive about this argument is that it will explain how
the agent weighed up the various potential reasons for action to which her
beliefs and desires could have given rise. It will include what we can call an
“evaluative” premise, 43 as long we understand that it is the agent’s evaluation
it expresses, not that of the observer. As observers, we do not need to
share the agent’s evaluative judgements. We might choose differently, in his
situation. But what we are trying to explain is his choice, not ours.
Among recent authors, it is G. F. Schueler who has most clearly highlighted
this point; one of his examples illustrates it. The example has to do
with a voter, faced with the decision about whether to vote for a tax increase.
The tax increase will make possible subsidized childcare, but it will also
mean that the agent will experience a loss of income. The following line of