Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

104 Theism and Explanation
Since David Hume’s day, there has been a philosophical debate about why
we take such arguments as seriously as we do. But that this is the form of
an inductive argument is not in dispute.
Now one could base an argument for the existence of God on inductive
reasoning, as Mill himself recognised when discussing the argument
from design. 12 A recent example is to be found in the work of William
Dembski, the “intelligent design” advocate. Dembski identifi es a feature
of living organisms which he calls “specifi ed complexity” and argues
that this is a reliable indicator of design. His reason for doing so, he
writes, is
a straightforward inductive argument: In every instance where the
complexity-specifi cation criterion attributes design and where the underlying
causal story is known (i.e., where we are not just dealing with
circumstantial evidence, but where, as it were, the video camera is running
and any putative designer would be caught red-handed), it turns
out design actually is present. 13
So Dembski’s inductive argument has the following form:
(1) Every observed instance of specifi ed complexity is explained by the
acts of some intelligent agent who brought it about.
(2) Therefore, every instance of specifi ed complexity is explained by the
acts of some intelligent agent who brought it about. 14
Admittedly, this is only the fi rst step in Dembski’s process of argumentation.
To support his conclusion that there exists a non-natural intelligent
agent, further premises are required, such as:
(3) The natural world exhibits specifi ed complexity.
(4) That specifi ed complexity could not have been produced by a natural
agent.
But the fi rst two steps do constitute an inductive argument. It may or may
not be a sound argument 15 —it seems all but identical, interestingly enough,
to that discussed by Mill—but it certainly moves from the observation of
particulars to a general statement.
6.1.2 Swinburne’s Arguments
What is important in this context is that this is not how Swinburne reasons.
He does not, for instance, argue:
(1) Every instance of a universe we have observed has a creator.
(2) Therefore all universes (including our own) probably have creators. 16