Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

64 Theism and Explanation
“occasionalism,” denies that there exist any created causes; the only agent
with the power to bring about effects is God. The occasionalist doctrine is
helpfully summarised by Steven Nadler. It is the belief that
God is directly, immediately, and solely responsible for bringing about all
phenomena. When a needle pricks the skin, the physical event is merely
an occasion for God to cause the appropriate mental event, a pain; a volition
in the soul to raise an arm or to think of something is only an occasion
for God to cause the arm to rise or the appropriate idea to become
present to the mind; and the impact of one billiard ball upon another is
an occasion for God to put the fi rst ball at rest and move the second ball.
In all three contexts—mind-body, body-mind, and mind alone—God’s
ubiquitous causal activity proceeds in accordance with certain general
laws, and (except in the case of miracles) he acts only when the required
requisite material or psychic conditions obtain. 16
Occasionalism was a popular view among medieval Muslim philosophers. 17
While it has been a minority view in the West, even there it has had its followers,
the best known of whom was Nicolas Malebranche (1638–1715).
Given the logic of theism, it is perhaps surprising that occasionalism
was not more popular. If the divine will is both a necessary and suffi cient
condition of the production of some effect, then why attribute the effect to
any other cause? For a consistent theist, it might be argued, talk of natural
causes is redundant (3.4.4). Occasionalism also takes a widely accepted
theistic principle—that God preserves all beings in existence—to its logical
conclusion. If a chair exists only because God wills it to exist (a principle
all theists accept), then surely it continues to exist and exists here rather
than there only because God wills it. And if it moves from here to there,
this, too, must be because God wills it. 18 But then why bother with secondary
causes? And from the theist’s point of view invoking secondary causes
is dangerous. For the existence of secondary causes might appear to make
talk of divine action redundant. Once you accept that there exist secondary
causes, it might appear that they can do all the explanatory work. 19 Indeed,
it is tempting to argue, with Ludwig Feuerbach, that belief in secondary
causes represents a failure of nerve: it is a compromise struck between “the
unbelieving intellect” and “the still believing heart.” 20
If a theist does adopt an occasionalist view, what happens to his understanding
of explanation? It is true that he can still offer natural explanations,
in the sense of explanations that make no immediate reference to
God. In this respect, the adoption of an occasionalist view leaves much of
the scientist’s work unchanged. 21 There can still exist a “natural philosophy.”
As Malebranche himself wrote,
recourse to God as the universal cause should not be had when the
explanation of particular effects is sought. For it would be ridiculous