Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

What are Theistic Explanations? 47
By the same act, say they, he sees past, present, and future: His love
and his hatred, his mercy and his justice are one individual operation:
He is entire in every point of space; and complete in every instance
of duration. No succession, no change, no acquisition, no diminution.
What he is implies in it not any shadow of distinction or diversity. And
what he is, this moment, has ever been, and ever will be, without any
new judgment, sentiment, or operation. He stands fi xed in one, simple,
perfect state; nor can you ever say, with any propriety, that this act of
his is different from that other, or that this judgment or idea has been
lately formed, and will give place, by succession, to any different judgement
or idea. 49
The diffi culty this poses for the theist, as Cleanthes argues, is that such a
doctrine of God is practically indistinguishable from atheism. It certainly
seems incompatible with the idea that God is a personal being, an agent
with beliefs, desires, and intentions. As Cleanthes writes,
a mind, whose acts and sentiments are not distinct and successive; one,
that is wholly simple and wholly immutable; is a mind which has no
thought, no reason, no will, no sentiment, no love, no hatred; or in a
word, is no mind at all. It is an abuse of terms to give it that appellation;
and we may as well speak of limited extension without fi gure, or
of number without composition. 50
Hume is not alone in expressing such doubts. At least one modern theist
philosopher, Alvin Plantinga, rejects the traditional doctrine of divine simplicity.
And one reason why he does so is that it apparently makes it impossible
to think of God as a person. 51
These discussions raise complex theological and metaphysical issues,
which would lie far beyond the scope of this study. And even if you reject
the doctrine of divine simplicity, there will be something deeply mysterious
about the mental states that the theist attributes to God. The underlying
question here is whether we can predicate any terms of God in their literal
sense. It is not only “liberal Protestant theologians” who deny this, as William
Alston suggests. 52 There is a long-standing theological tradition that
does so, extending from Pseudo-Dionysius (in the fi fth century) to Richard
Swinburne (3.3.3). It is not without its exceptions. Edward Schoen, for
instance, argues that we can, in fact, predicate terms of God univocally. 53
But it is safe to say that Schoen’s position is a minority one. No less a fi gure
than Thomas Aquinas denies that “what is said of God and creatures is said
of them univocally.” 54 To use terms univocally of God and creatures, Aquinas
argues, would imply that “they stood in the same rank.” 55 But this is
manifestly untrue, since “the divine substance, by its immensity, transcends
every form that our intellect can realise.” 56 If we can say anything positive
about God, it is only because effects necessarily resemble their causes. 57