Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

88 Theism and Explanation
Why not, indeed?
Now there may be an answer to this last objection. Perhaps there is
an essence of what it is to be a panda which would be violated by giving
pandas wings, but not violated by giving them a more effi cient “thumb.”
Perhaps a panda with wings would no longer be a panda. But I don’t want
to pursue that line of argument here. My point is that Nelson’s criticism of
Gould’s argument is misplaced. It is true that Gould’s suboptimality argument
is not, as it stands, a strong one. But this is because he has not thought
clearly about the structure of proposed theistic explanations. And the theist
has, in any case, given him no explanation which he could counter. So what
Gould offers is merely a sketch of a suboptimality argument.
Let me explain. I have argued that to have any signifi cant degree of
content, a proposed theistic explanation must posit, not merely that the
explanandum was produced by God, but that it was produced by God in
pursuit of some goal (3.2.3). It cannot be a simple causal attribution. (It is
against such vague references to a “divine plan” that Darwin seems to have
rebelled [1.3.2], arguing, quite correctly, that they lacked empirical content.
29 ) It follows that the optimality condition is a condition imposed on a
theistic explanation, that is to say, one that specifi es such an intention. It is
up to theists to specify just what God had in mind when he created pandas.
And it will not do merely to add “God willed it” to our existing description
of a panda. That would be a spurious “explanation,” of the kind that Sober
criticises (5.2.2). The theist must explain what divine purpose God had in
mind in creating such beings. Only then can we ask if a better implementation
of that intention is conceivable.
It follows that what the optimality condition specifi es is not some kind
of overall optimality—a “perfect panda,” whatever that would be. It is
optimality in relation to a specifi ed divine purpose. It is up to the theist
to nominate just what that purpose is. Unfortunately, theists do not offer
us much guidance when it comes to pandas. (It is striking how few facts
theists actually try to explain, despite their grandiose claim that theism is
a hypothesis of universal scope [7.2.2].) So let me follow up on my earlier
suggestion (5.2.2). Let’s posit that God created pandas because he wanted
to create an animal that would strip bamboo. Then Gould’s suboptimality
argument would come into play. He could argue that this “thumb” is an
ineffi cient way of stripping bamboo. It is not the kind of design we would
expect of an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect creator. Once
again, one could take issue with his conclusion—the idea that God must
aim at “effi ciency” is particularly questionable (5.4.1)—but the optimality
condition on which Gould’s argument rests is surely correct.
5.3.3 Optimal Divine Action
At what conclusion have I arrived? It is that a proposed theistic explanation
of any fact must be regarded as a pseudo-explanation if the explanandum