Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

20 Theism and Explanation
particular events are attributed. 3 But many of these deities are thought of in
strikingly anthropomorphic ways. They have limited knowledge and power
and are sometimes far from benevolent.
In practice, even those who are theists—in the sense of Christian theism—sometimes
think of God in strikingly anthropomorphic ways. Within
the Jewish and Christian Scriptures, there are passages which suggest that
the God of whom they speak is merely one divine being among others,
or that he is far from unambiguously good. And there is some evidence
that, even today, the working concept of God employed by many Jews and
Christians is similarly anthropomorphic. It is true that such believers will
produce a “theologically correct” description of God if asked to do so. But
when asked to make rapid inferences about divine action, the conception
of God which they employ is very different from that which they have been
taught. 4 However, we can set those issues aside here. It is the God of the
philosophers and theologians with which I am concerned here.
One group of thinkers might at fi rst sight seem to escape this net. Ironically,
it is precisely those who most vigorously protest the methodological
naturalism of the sciences, namely the advocates of intelligent design (ID).
What is striking about such thinkers is that they generally avoid identifying
their alleged designer. To the extent that they do this, their theory
(if it warrants that name 5 ) falls short of being a religious explanation. At
best, it represents a fi rst step towards a religious explanation. But it is clear
from the other writings of intelligent design theorists—such as Stephen
Meyer 6 —that their arguments are intended to lend support to a religious
explanation. And the religious explanation in question is theistic. It is the
God of Jewish, Christian, and Islamic theism whose agency they are wanting
to invoke. 7
2.1.2 Proposed, Potential, and Actual Explanations
A second clarifi cation has to do with the appropriateness of the phrase
“theistic explanation.” The problem here is that “explanation” can be
thought of as a success term. As such, it would properly be used only of
theories that have been shown to be true, or at least worthy of our provisional
acceptance. On this view, propositions about divine agency would
become pseudo-explanations by virtue of having been superseded. If they
are not true, or if they no longer deserve our acceptance, they are simply
not explanations.
There is something to be said for this understanding of the term “explanation.”
But at fi rst sight it seems to undermine the very project I am
undertaking. For it would apparently undercut the distinction I made earlier
between de facto and in principle objections to theistic explanations.
The de facto objection, you will recall, holds that some accounts of divine
action are indeed explanations—they have some explanatory force—but
that we no longer have suffi cient reason to regard them as true (or worthy