Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

30 Theism and Explanation
(3.2.3.1). For the moment, I wish merely to ask what kind of an objection
it is. If we employ the distinction I have just outlined, this argument
counts as a de facto objection to theistic explanations. For even if any event
could be substituted for E—which, incidentally, I don’t believe to be true
(3.2.3.1)—H would still be a potential explanation of E. One could use H
to construct an argument that corresponds to the second premise of Peirce’s
schema, albeit in an almost trivial fashion.
(1) God wills E.
(2) Whatever God wills comes about.
(3) Therefore E.
But, of course, “God wills E” will still fail to count as an actual explanation.
Why? Because it would have practically no empirical content (3.2.3)
and would not be independently testable (7.1).
The point I am making here is that, on my terms, the above objection
is a de facto objection, not an in principle one. This may seem odd. I can
imagine someone else regarding it as an in principle objection; some of the
authors cited above seem to have done so. But the problem here is largely
terminological. My distinction is not the only one that could be adopted in
such discussions. But I have to start somewhere, and this is the distinction
I shall use in the discussion that follows.
2.2.2 The Way Ahead
The distinctions I have made will determine the shape of the discussion to
come. Chapters 3 and 4 are largely descriptive, setting out as clearly as possible
just what I mean by a proposed theistic explanation. Chapter 3 will
take as its starting point the explanans of such a proposed explanation. It
will argue that a theistic explanation is a theoretical explanation, positing
a particular divine intention, and embodying a causal claim. In the course
of the discussion, I shall examine two initial objections to the very idea of
such an explanation. The fi rst is that the idea of a divine agent is internally
inconsistent. The second is the related claim that the will of God cannot be
described as a cause. Neither objection, I shall argue, is necessarily fatal,
although both imply that the theist has some work to do.
Chapter 4 will continue my description of theistic explanations, but from
the point of view of their explananda. I shall argue that theistic explanations
cover both events and states of affairs and that they embody both
singular and general causal claims. I shall then examine the relationship
between theistic and secular explanations, highlighting the fact that the
two forms of explanation can, on occasions, be complementary. This will
bring me to a third objection to such proposed explanations, which has to
do with miracles. At least some theistic explanations posit miracles. And
all theistic explanations posit an agent capable of working miracles. But