Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

What Would They Explain? 71
to produce beings like us. How can we explain this fact? One could argue
that it is merely an observational selection effect—that given our existence,
the universe had to be as it was. (If the laws of nature and initial conditions
had been other than they were, we would not be here to ask the question.)
As it happens, Swinburne rejects this defl ationary response. The reasons
he offers may be less than convincing, 41 but let me leave that aside for the
moment. All I am trying to do here is to analyse the structure of his argument.
What Swinburne argues is that this apparent fi ne-tuning would be
just what we would expect, given that there existed a God who intended
there to be creatures such as ourselves.
But Swinburne does not consider the theistic story to be the only potential
explanation of the apparent “fi ne-tuning.” There exists a non-theistic
alternative, namely the “multiverse” hypothesis. According to this view,
there may exist, either simultaneously or consecutively, a number of universes.
If there were a suffi cient number of such universes, 42 it would not be
surprising if, by chance, one of them were conducive to the emergence of
carbon-based life-forms. Swinburne responds to this alternative explanation
in various ways. But one of his responses is that, unless there is independent
evidence of the existence of multiple universes, the multiverse hypothesis
would be both ad hoc and an offence against the virtue of simplicity. 43
There is something to be said for this argument, although I shall argue later
for a different conception of simplicity than that favoured by Swinburne
(7.4). I shall also introduce another explanatory virtue, that of ontological
economy (7.5), which might seem to favour the multiverse scenario. 44 But
once again let me leave that aside and focus on the pattern of Swinburne’s
argument. Swinburne admits that there is a rival, natural hypothesis, while
arguing that the theistic hypothesis is to be preferred. And that is one of the
options open to a theist when contesting a natural explanation.
4.4 THE PROBLEM OF MIRACLES
Let me end this chapter by addressing another in principle objection to
theistic explanations, which relates to miracles. In offering theistic explanations,
theists posit the existence of an agent who is capable of working
miracles. Indeed they sometimes claim that he has brought about the factto-be-explained
by means of a miracle. Does this appeal to a miracle-working
agent undermine the force of proposed religious explanations? Does it
constitute an argument against their explanatory force?
4.4.1 Positing Miracles
When the theist offers an explanation of an event which lacks a natural
explanation—a fact which is naturally unexplained (4.3.2.1), naturally inexplicable
(4.3.2.2), or whose natural explanation he contests (4.3.3.2)—is