Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

40 Theism and Explanation
Similar questions could be raised about theistic explanations, for the
simple reason that they are a subset of intentional explanations. If all intentional
explanations are fatally fl awed, then theistic explanations are fatally
fl awed as well. They will suffer from just the same defects and they could
be dismissed for just the same reasons. No further discussion would be
required. If, on the other hand, intentional explanations are acceptable in
principle, then theistic explanations cannot be rejected on these grounds
alone. If the proposed explanations that invoke God as an agent are to
be regarded as pseudo-explanations, some further argumentation will be
required. It follows that anyone who wishes to defend theistic explanations
will also need, as a fi rst step, to defend intentional explanations.
As it happens, I believe intentional explanations can be defended, that
despite their imprecision they do have explanatory force. It follows that
while proposed theistic explanations may suffer various other, perhaps
fatal fl aws, the mere fact that they are intentional explanations is not
suffi cient reason to reject them. As I mentioned earlier (2.2.2), I have
relegated my defence of intentional explanations to an appendix. No
aspect of that discussion relates to theistic explanations, except insofar
as these are a species of intentional explanation, and I was anxious to
spare the reader a tedious digression. At this point, let me merely state
my conclusions. If you believe that intentional explanations require further
defence, or you disagree with my conclusions, you may wish to
consult that discussion.
An intentional explanation, as I suggested earlier (2.1.4), is best
regarded as an argument. It is very particular kind of argument, namely
a practical syllogism. This syllogism begins by positing an agent possessing
a certain intention, along with a set of beliefs relevant to its attainment,
and has as its conclusion a description of the explanandum. Such
an explanation does not depend on laws describing a regular association
of intentions and actions. (There may be rough and ready laws of this
sort, but an intentional explanation does not need to cite them.) What an
intentional explanation relies on is another kind of generalisation, namely
a rationality principle. It presumes that the agent will act rationally in
order to attain her intended goal. Like the legal presumption of innocence,
this presumption of rationality is defeasible. Admittedly, it is not easily
defeated. But if it were, if we were forced to conclude that the agent is acting
irrationally, some other form of explanation would be required. I shall
also argue that proposed intentional explanations are testable, insofar
as they allow us to make predictions. If a prediction turns out to be correct,
our explanation is corroborated. But if we continually fail to make
successful predictions, we should consider abandoning our intentional
hypothesis. Only a persistent failure to corroborate a range of proposed
intentional explanations would warrant the conclusion that the agent is,
in fact, acting irrationally.