Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

What are Theistic Explanations? 53
And then A 2 must be linked to B by an intermediate causal process, A 3 , and
so ad infi nitum. How can this be avoided? Well, if the “intermediate causal
process” (A 1 ) is not a distinct cause, then it is presumably nothing more
than a specifi cation of how cause A operates. In this case, what is being
affi rmed is a direct causal link between A and B.
A → B
And there is nothing incoherent about the idea that the divine will could be
a direct cause of this type. 80
3.4.3 God and Causation
But behind these misplaced objections lurks a more serious diffi culty. It is
the diffi culty of fi nding a conception of causation that is applicable to the
posited divine agent. It might be tempting, for instance, for a theist to adopt
the counterfactual analysis of causation. 81 Applied to theistic explanations,
such an analysis implies merely that if God had not willed the explanandum,
then some other state of affairs would prevail. It may be that this
is not an adequate analysis of what we mean by “cause.” 82 Mackie, for
instance, feels compelled to supplement it with the idea of causal priority. 83
But if one could defend a counterfactual analysis of causation, its theistic
use might, at fi rst sight, seem unexceptionable. 84
On closer analysis, however, this impression would be misleading. There
may be diffi culties with regarding the action of God as a cause, even in the
counterfactual sense. Quentin Smith, for instance, argues that the very idea
that God could be the cause of some state of affairs is incoherent. His particular
target is the idea that God could be the cause of the universe, and in
particular the cause of the “big bang,” the event thought by many to be the
beginning of the universe. 85 Smith concedes that his is a minority position,
that “virtually all contemporary theists, agnostics, and atheists” believe
that there are no logical problems with the idea that God could be the cause
of the universe. 86 But of course a minority position may still be correct. And
if it is, then proposed theistic explanations are entirely without content. So
let me examine Smith’s arguments, to see if the theist has at least a prima
facie case to answer.
3.4.3.1 A De Facto Argument
Smith offers two arguments against the idea of divine causation. The fi rst
is a de facto argument, which rests on the claim that there is no existing
sense of the word “cause” that is applicable to God. Smith begins
with Hume’s infl uential defi nition of causality, with its three conditions
of temporal priority, spatial contiguity, and law-like conjunction. Smith