Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

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What are Theistic Explanations? 57 the big bang” and “the big bang does not occur” contradict one another. But, the objection goes, one can avoid this contradiction simply by rewording the proposition about divine agency. “There occurs a willing that has as its aim the actualization of the big bang, but the big bang is not actualized” is not self-contradictory. 99 So if the two events are appropriately described, their relationship could be thought of as causal. But, Smith counters, even given this redescription, it may still be true that “the divine volition necessarily possess[es] the relational property of being conjoined with the occurrence of the big bang.” 100 Fair enough. It may still be impossible that the act of will should occur and that its intended effect should not. But the possession of a property of this kind is a metaphysical, not a logical fact. All-in-all, then, I am far from convinced by Smith’s second, in principle argument. If we do reject it, but acknowledge the force of his fi rst, de facto argument, then we must—sadly for the atheist—settle for a more modest conclusion. It is a conclusion which does not rule out the possibility of a successful theistic explanation. It is true that if none of our existing accounts of causation are applicable to God, then the onus is on theists to come up with another. And given the diffi culties philosophers have had making sense of our everyday use of “cause,” we cannot expect this will be an easy task. But the failure of our existing ideas of cause to make sense of theistic claims does not necessarily mean those claims are incoherent. It may suggest merely that there is more work for a theistic philosopher to do. 3.4.4 The Ubiquity of Divine Causation Here’s a fi nal observation before I leave this topic of God and causation. We have seen that on the theistic hypothesis, God is a causal factor in every event which occurs (3.2.3). He may not cause events directly, but he certainly does so indirectly. His willing event E is a necessary condition of the occurrence of E: if he did not will E, then E would not occur. As Swinburne writes, “if there is a God, he is omnipresent and all causal processes operate only because he sustains them.” 101 This means that, from the theist’s point of view, no explanation is complete without reference to God. 102 If God exists, then any complete explanation of any fact must at some point make reference to divine action. The question this raises for the theist is, at fi rst sight, a surprising one. It is whether, given the truth of theism, there can exist a natural explanation of any fact. If God is causally involved in every event, does it make sense to speak of a non-theistic explanation of that event? If we assert that God is the cause of E, then does that assertion not occupy all the explanatory space, as it were? What else could possibly remain to be said? It is perhaps this idea that gave rise to the theological position I shall examine shortly (“occasionalism”), which denies the reality of “secondary” or created causes (4.3.1). Does the explanatory logic of theism compel a theist to be an occasionalist, to deny the force of any natural explanation?
58 Theism and Explanation No, it does not. Given the truth of theism, we can still speak of a natural explanation of some event. Or at least, we can still do so if we admit that not every explanation need be a complete explanation. 103 I anticipated this suggestion when I argued that Richard Dawkins’s objection to theistic explanations was unsound (1.3.3). Pace Dawkins, 104 it is not a necessary condition of a successful explanation that it can explain its explanans. 105 If we follow my earlier suggestion and assume that explanations are arguments (2.1.4), then an explanation is an argument which has the explanandum as its conclusion. To explain an explosion, for instance, all we need is a description of a leak of gas, coupled with a description of its causal fi eld, and some low-level laws regarding the behaviour of gases. One might argue that a complete explanation would need to cite further laws, which would explain the lower-level laws. 106 Of course, this leads to a regress of explanations, which may or may not have an end. 107 But that doesn’t matter, since it is not obligatory. We do not need to have a complete explanation in order to have an explanation. In speaking of a natural explanation of some phenomenon, where might a theist draw the line? Well, assuming that there exist created causes— what are traditionally called “secondary causes”—God could act in two ways. He could bring about an effect immediately, merely by willing it. We could then describe the outcome as a “miracle.” But God could also act by way of secondary causes, using them as his instrument. Of a miracle, there is, by defi nition, no natural explanation. But if an event is not thought of as a miracle, a theist could concede that there exists a natural explanation of that event. A natural explanation would cite those secondary causes which were responsible for bringing about the effect, without prejudice to the idea that they, in turn, depend on God. How might the theist reconcile these two forms of explanation? The following chapter will seek to answer that question.
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Theism and Explanation
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Theism and Explanation Gregory W. D
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To Anna who never tires of asking
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Acknowledgements My thanks are due
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2 Theism and Explanation Could it m
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4 Theism and Explanation While I ho
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Inference to the Best Explanation 1
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7 Successful Theistic Explanations
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Successful Theistic Explanations 11
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8 Conclusion Miss Binney spoke as i
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Conclusion 145 explanation that met
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Appendix Intentional Explanations M
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Appendix 149 attend any discussion
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Appendix 151 explanation is a causa
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Appendix 153 we assume is a “myth
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Appendix 155 Will this suffi ce as
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Appendix 157 reasoning, Schueler su
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Appendix 159 action, one that has a
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Appendix 161 estimate of her charac
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Appendix 163 causal laws do exist.
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Appendix 165 this is the explanatio
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Notes NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 1. Numbers
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Notes 169 James Maclaurin has remin
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Notes 171 19. Musgrave, “Scientif
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Notes 173 the most explicit in its
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Notes 175 any true proposition, the
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Notes 177 weaker but to their mind
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Notes 179 15. Hume, “Dialogues,
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Notes 181 19. Swinburne, Is There a
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Notes 183 it will also confi rm H 2
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Notes 185 91. I am grateful to Geor
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Notes 187 this be a fatal objection
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Notes 189 71. Lakatos, “Falsifi c
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192 Bibliography Behe, Michael J. D
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194 Bibliography Dembski, William A
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196 Bibliography . A Treatise of Hu
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198 Bibliography Melnyk, Andrew. A
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200 Bibliography Rundle, Bede. 2004
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Index A abduction: and induction, 1
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defences, and theodicies, 134-35 de
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intelligent design theory: argument
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preemption, causal. See causal pree
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tsunami, Boxing Day, 60, 61, 68, 14
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