Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

52 Theism and Explanation
a necessary condition of a causal explanation. But I shall argue later that it
is not (Appendix 3.3.1), that causal explanations do not necessarily involve
causal laws. 77 If this is true, then there is no diffi culty with the idea that an
intentional explanation is also a causal explanation.
3.4.2 Intermediate Causal Mechanisms
But a different objection may be raised, one that suggests that even if
intentional explanations in general can be causal explanations, proposed
theistic explanations cannot. They fail to be causal explanations—or, at
least, adequate causal explanations—because they say nothing about the
mechanism of divine action. Adolf Grünbaum articulates this objection,
arguing that
the hypothesis of divine creation does not even envision, let alone
specify an appropriate intermediate causal process that would link
the presence of the supposed divine (causal) agency to the effects that
are attributed to it. Nor, it seems is there any prospect at all that the
chronic inscrutability of the putative causal linkage will be removed by
new theoretical developments. 78
It is diffi cult to know what to make of this objection. It is of the essence of
the theistic hypothesis that God can bring about events and states of affairs
directly, without any intermediate causal process. Ex hypothesi, God could
(if he chose) bring about any effect merely by willing it, as a basic action. 79
Indeed given the traditional concept of God, the divine will is unfailingly
effi cacious. We cannot conceive of a situation in which God wills some
state of affairs and it fails to come about. Of course, one might argue that
positing the existence of such a being—one possessed of “magical” powers—is
extravagant, in the sense that it is not warranted by the evidence.
One might also point out that we know of no other causal process of this
type (7.2). But it is no objection to the idea of divine action, the idea that
the will of God could bring about some state of affairs.
In fact, taken at face value, Grünbaum’s argument leads to an infi nite
regress of causal attributions. What it appears to be saying is that if we
claim that A causes B, we must be able to specify an “intermediate causal
process” that links A and B. Let’s call this intermediate causal process A 1 .
A → A 1 → B
But is A 1 itself a cause? Then its causal relationship to B (for example)
requires a further intermediate causal mechanism, namely A 2 .
A → A 1 → A 2 → B