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What are Theistic Explanations? 55 effi cacious cause is to reject the theistic hypothesis. For as we have seen, God’s willing of an event or state of affairs cannot be other than unfailingly effi cacious. It is unthinkable that God would will e and that e would not occur. And it is unthinkable that God, the divine cause, could be dependent, even counterfactually, on what he himself creates. It follows that the counterfactual analysis of causation is not applicable to God. It cannot avoid the “spurious causal dependence” problem identifi ed by Lewis. 3.4.3.2 An In Principle Argument These refl ections bring Smith to his second, in principle, argument against the idea of divine causation. It relies on the idea that if an event or state, x, is a logically suffi cient condition of another event or state, y, then x cannot also be the cause of y. To take Smith’s example, “a body’s being in motion is logically suffi cient condition of the body occupying space.” 95 So far, so good, although this surely needs rewording. If the condition in question is logical, it seems better to express it as a relationship between propositions. The truth of the proposition “the body is in motion” is a logically suffi cient condition of the truth of the proposition “the body occupies space.” For if a body is in motion, it must also be in space, and we could understand this from an analysis of both concepts. Nonetheless, Smith argues, “the body’s being in motion is not the cause of the body’s occupation of space.” 96 This, too, seems correct. Intuitively, at least, we would not speak of this as a cause. This gives us, in Smith’s view, a distinction between logically suffi cient conditions and causes. Into which category does the action of God fall? Smith argues that God’s willing y is a logically suffi cient condition of y. Again, we might more accurately express this in terms of propositions. Where y is any event, the truth of “God wills y” is a logically suffi cient condition of “y occurs.” For if an omnipotent being wills y and y does not occur, then the agent in question is not an omnipotent being. But this is a contradiction. Given the principle that a logically suffi cient condition cannot be a cause, it follows that God’s willing y cannot be a cause of y. Smith speaks of a cause of the universe, but it seems it would be true whatever we substitute for y. If this argument is sound, it is a fatal objection to the very idea of a theistic explanation. For it entails that any argument which suggests that x—let’s say the universe—has a cause is also an argument against the idea that its cause is a divine state. And on the assumption that all explanations are causal explanations, then there could never be a successful theistic explanation. How might the defender of theistic explanations respond? Are all explanations causal? One response would be to deny the assumption: the idea that all explanations are causal explanations. The theist might argue that while all scientifi c explanations might be causal explanations, when science runs out, theology takes over. And what theology offers is a
56 Theism and Explanation non-causal explanation. One problem with this response is that it undermines the apparent parallel between scientifi c and proposed theistic explanations, and for many theists it is this parallel that can be used to lend support to theism (3.1). It would also require a radical rethink of what we mean by a theistic explanation, my own reconstruction of which assumes that such explanations are causal explanations. So is there another way out? A case of fallacious reasoning? A second response would cast doubt on the cogency of Smith’s argument. If God exists, his willing is unfailingly effi cacious. Necessarily, if God wills some event, then it occurs. But does it follow that if God wills that event, it necessarily occurs? Apparently not. We can see this by representing God’s act of willing as G, and the explanandum as E. The following argument, where the symbol □ means “necessarily,” represents a fallacy. (1) □ (G ⊃ E) (2) G ∴ (3) □ E. 97 If this argument were valid, then every truth would be a necessary truth. 98 For one could substitute for G and E any fact A. (1) □ (A ⊃ A) (2) A ∴ (3) □ A. But this is an unacceptable conclusion. A category mistake? A third response would be to suggest that Smith’s argument rests on a kind of category mistake, confusing logical and metaphysical issues. There is a sense in which God’s willing E “necessitates” the occurrence of E. But the necessity here is not in the fi rst place logical, but metaphysical. It is true that when it is expressed in propositions, there exists a logical relationship between those propositions. As we’ve just seen, one could set out this relationship in terms of a deductive argument. (1) All events willed by God occur. (2) E is willed by God. (3) Therefore E occurs. But the truth of the premises is not itself a mere matter of logic. If God exists, then his willing E is unfailingly effi cacious because of the kind of being God is. Smith all but acknowledges this point when responding to an objection. His original argument was that the propositions “an omnipotent agent wills
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Theism and Explanation
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Theism and Explanation Gregory W. D
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To Anna who never tires of asking
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Acknowledgements My thanks are due
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2 Theism and Explanation Could it m
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Inference to the Best Explanation 1
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7 Successful Theistic Explanations
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Successful Theistic Explanations 11
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8 Conclusion Miss Binney spoke as i
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Conclusion 145 explanation that met
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Appendix Intentional Explanations M
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Appendix 149 attend any discussion
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Appendix 151 explanation is a causa
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Appendix 153 we assume is a “myth
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Appendix 155 Will this suffi ce as
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Appendix 157 reasoning, Schueler su
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Appendix 159 action, one that has a
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Appendix 161 estimate of her charac
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Appendix 163 causal laws do exist.
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Appendix 165 this is the explanatio
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Notes NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 1. Numbers
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Notes 169 James Maclaurin has remin
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Notes 171 19. Musgrave, “Scientif
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Notes 173 the most explicit in its
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Notes 175 any true proposition, the
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Notes 177 weaker but to their mind
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Notes 179 15. Hume, “Dialogues,
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Notes 181 19. Swinburne, Is There a
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Notes 183 it will also confi rm H 2
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Notes 185 91. I am grateful to Geor
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Notes 187 this be a fatal objection
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Notes 189 71. Lakatos, “Falsifi c
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192 Bibliography Behe, Michael J. D
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194 Bibliography Dembski, William A
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196 Bibliography . A Treatise of Hu
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198 Bibliography Melnyk, Andrew. A
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200 Bibliography Rundle, Bede. 2004
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Index A abduction: and induction, 1
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defences, and theodicies, 134-35 de
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intelligent design theory: argument
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preemption, causal. See causal pree
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tsunami, Boxing Day, 60, 61, 68, 14
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