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Inference to the Best Explanation 113 might judge it to be the best, if it had competitors. I have just argued (6.2.1) that such a policy can be defended against van Fraassen’s objections (3.1.1). But I have not yet produced any positive arguments in its favour. Can our use of this policy of theory choice be justifi ed? William Lycan argues—rightly, it seems to me—that we cannot justify such a policy. We cannot justify it precisely because its principles are fundamental. They are the principles by which we justify, which cannot be justifi ed in turn. Lycan repeatedly cites Jeremy Bentham’s principle in this context, namely “that which is used to prove everything else . . . cannot itself be proved.” 51 If we look at instances of theory-choice that we judge, intuitively, to be rational, we discover that these are the kinds of principles they employ. 52 So we have reason to think that this is what it means to act rationally. End of story. For as Lycan writes, “rationality is a primitive term used to evaluate epistemic acts; particular principles are seen to “tend toward truth,” because the beliefs they produce are rational, not the other way around.” 53 But while we cannot offer an epistemic justifi cation of these principles, we can offer an explanation of why it is that we employ them. Lycan’s explanation is a broadly evolutionary one, which appeals to the usefulness of such a procedure. Crudely, the idea is . . . that it is a good thing in cost-benefi t terms, that we choose theories on the basis of simplicity and the other explanatory virtues. Specifi cally, these methods of theory choice are the ones that a wise and benevolent Mother Nature would have given us, . . . because our having these methods rather than others has survival (and welfare) advantage. 54 Once again, to say this is not to argue that such principles are truth-conducive because they are useful. 55 Rather, it is to explain why we regard such principles as truth-conducive. In this context, Lycan argues, such an explanation is the best we can do. Does it matter if you are not convinced by Lycan’s arguments? Probably not. For I could also approach this matter in an entirely pragmatic manner, by referring to the bare fact that these are the criteria we employ. As Lycan notes, these are the principles that underlie what we regard, intuitively, as our best scientifi c practice. As a matter of fact, we prefer theories that have a high degree of testability, and are simple, ontologically economical, and informative. There are various reasons that can be given for our having this preference, but the preference itself is not in doubt. So all I need do is to appeal to this widely-held view, which is also that adopted by at least some theistic philosophers. For while not all theists present their arguments for the existence of God as “inference to the best explanation” arguments, there are some who do. And those who do—thinkers such as
114 Theism and Explanation Stephen Meyer, Arthur Peacocke, and Michael Banner—appeal to explanatory virtues that closely resemble those I am employing here. Even Richard Swinburne, who does not appeal to “best explanation” principles, argues that the theistic hypothesis is a theory of great simplicity and scope, and that this represents evidence in its favour (6.1.2.2). My question is: Could such philosophers be right? What chance is there that a theistic explanation could prove to be not merely a potential explanation, but the best (or at least a satisfactory) explanation of some fact about the world? That’s the question for my fi nal chapter.
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Theism and Explanation
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Theism and Explanation Gregory W. D
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To Anna who never tires of asking
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Acknowledgements My thanks are due
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2 Theism and Explanation Could it m
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4 Theism and Explanation While I ho
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6 Theism and Explanation experiment
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8 Theism and Explanation Plantinga
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10 Theism and Explanation explanati
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12 Theism and Explanation by refere
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14 Theism and Explanation explanati
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16 Theism and Explanation God creat
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2 On Explanations in General “Exp
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On Explanations in General 21 of ou
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On Explanations in General 23 merel
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Figure 2.2 Swinburne’s conception
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On Explanations in General 27 simil
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On Explanations in General 29 condi
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On Explanations in General 31 could
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3 What are Theistic Explanations? I
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What are Theistic Explanations? 35
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3.2.2 Positing a Divine Agent What
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4 What Would They Explain? It’s a
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4.2 SINGULAR AND GENERAL EXPLANATIO
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Page 93 and 94: 82 Theism and Explanation 5.1.3 Is
Page 95 and 96: 84 Theism and Explanation eye. But
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Page 109 and 110: 98 Theism and Explanation (2.1.2) t
Page 112 and 113: 6 Inference to the Best Explanation
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Page 154 and 155: 8 Conclusion Miss Binney spoke as i
Page 156 and 157: Conclusion 145 explanation that met
Page 158 and 159: Appendix Intentional Explanations M
Page 160 and 161: Appendix 149 attend any discussion
Page 162 and 163: Appendix 151 explanation is a causa
Page 164 and 165: Appendix 153 we assume is a “myth
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Page 168 and 169: Appendix 157 reasoning, Schueler su
Page 170 and 171: Appendix 159 action, one that has a
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Appendix 163 causal laws do exist.
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Appendix 165 this is the explanatio
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Notes NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 1. Numbers
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Notes 169 James Maclaurin has remin
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Notes 171 19. Musgrave, “Scientif
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Notes 173 the most explicit in its
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Notes 175 any true proposition, the
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Notes 177 weaker but to their mind
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Notes 179 15. Hume, “Dialogues,
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Notes 181 19. Swinburne, Is There a
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Notes 183 it will also confi rm H 2
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Notes 185 91. I am grateful to Geor
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Notes 187 this be a fatal objection
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Notes 189 71. Lakatos, “Falsifi c
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192 Bibliography Behe, Michael J. D
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194 Bibliography Dembski, William A
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196 Bibliography . A Treatise of Hu
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198 Bibliography Melnyk, Andrew. A
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200 Bibliography Rundle, Bede. 2004
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Index A abduction: and induction, 1
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defences, and theodicies, 134-35 de
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intelligent design theory: argument
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preemption, causal. See causal pree
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tsunami, Boxing Day, 60, 61, 68, 14
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