Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

108 Theism and Explanation
a “best explanation” account of what he calls “biological information.” In
the course of doing so, he argues inductively, from our previous experience
of intelligent designers. But as I have already suggested (6.1.2), there is no
evidence that Swinburne is offering an argument of this kind, one that
refers to previous observed instances of the fact in question. Swinburne
does claim that the explanation he is offering is a species of personal, or (as
I have described it) intentional explanation. 35 So it is presumably an intentional
explanation that meets the requirement of Peirce’s second premise by
taking us from H to E. But other than assuming that it is probabilistic in
form, Swinburne never spells out just what kind of argument this involves.
My own view will by now be familiar. It is that an intentional explanation
is best regarded as a species of deductive argument.
6.2 THE BEST EXPLANATION
It seems, then, that Swinburne’s arguments for the existence of God follow,
more or less, the pattern of Peirce’s abductive schema. They are,
therefore, best analysed as abductive arguments, of the form I discussed at
the starting point of my enquiry (2.1.2). I shall argue in a moment (6.2.1)
that abductive reasoning can be defended as a form of inference to the
best explanation (IBE). And, as a number of authors have argued, 36 IBE
is particularly well-adapted for a defence of theism. Firstly, it can be used
to support the positing of unobservable (or at least unobserved) entities.
To mount a directly inductive argument, of the kind offered by William
Dembski (6.1.1), requires the theist to produce past instances in which this
posited cause can be observed at work. But IBE allows us to posit a cause
which we have never before observed at work. Secondly, and for precisely
the same reason, IBE can be used to support singular causal claims (4.2.1).
Even if we know of only one event of the type in question (such as the “big
bang,” commonly, but no longer universally, 37 thought to mark the beginning
of our universe), we can legitimately posit a cause and argue for its
existence in the manner Peirce indicates. All we need is a non-inductive way
of arguing that “if H were true, E is what we would expect” (2.1.2), that is
to say, one that does not need to appeal to past instances of this correlation.
And in the case of intentional explanations, this is precisely what we have
(Appendix 1.3), in the form of the rationality principle (5.2).
6.2.1 The Problem of Abduction
But I’m now jumping ahead of myself. Let me return to the question of
abduction, for at fi rst sight this might seem a poor kind of argument. To
Peirce’s credit, he is very careful in the wording of his schema. Its conclusion
is not “H is true,” but “there is reason to suspect H is true.” But let’s be
less cautious for a moment, and formulate an abductive argument without
such qualifi cations.