Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

Appendix 149
attend any discussion of causation, let alone one that posits a divine agent
(3.4.3). But as Davidson argues, if we do not recognize a reason as a cause,
in some sense of that word, it is hard to make any sense of the idea that I
am acting for a reason. In particular, it would seem impossible to distinguish
the reason for which I acted from a reason which I had but which was
incidental to my acting as I did. (Being hungry, I had a reason to go to the
kitchen, namely to fi nd something to eat, but the reason I actually went to
the kitchen was to make a coffee. So among the reasons I had for performing
this action, only one actually brought it about.)
To say that a reason can be a cause is to leave open the question of what
kind of cause it is. 7 It may be a very different kind of cause from that which
we fi nd elsewhere in the natural world, perhaps one that does not operate
according to strict laws (Appendix 3.3). And to say that a reason is a cause
is not to eliminate the agent herself from the process. It is the agent who is
acting (Appendix 1.2); what we are trying to explain is why she is acting in
this particular way. There are philosophers who continue to reject Davidson’s
causal thesis, 8 but I shall not attempt to answer them here. Rather, I
shall simply assume that the casual thesis is defensible and shall develop its
implications in the course of the discussion.
A.1.2 The Belief-Desire Thesis
What about Davidson’s fi rst thesis, namely his belief-desire thesis (BD)?
There are two points which may be made here. Let me start with the less
controversial, which is a mere matter of clarifi cation. It relates to the
term “desire.” While “belief-desire thesis” is a convenient shorthand,
“desire” needs to be understood in the broadest possible sense. Davidson’s
own preferred term is pro attitude, and he makes it clear that a pro
attitude can be (for example) an evaluative belief. As he writes, under
pro attitudes
are to be included desires, wantings, urges, promptings, and a great
variety of moral views, aesthetic principles, economic prejudices, social
conventions, and public and private goals and values in so far as these
can be interpreted as attitudes of an agent directed towards actions of
a certain kind. 9
This is a signifi cant point, for not every desire constitutes a reason to act. 110
An agent may have a desire, but in the light of some evaluative belief may
choose not to act on it (Appendix 2.2).
Let me approach this point obliquely, by way of an apparent objection
to Davidson’s belief-desire thesis. The objection has to do with what it
means to act intentionally. It might seem that to cite an agent’s beliefs and
desires is not yet to offer an adequate account of intentional action. For a
desire may cause an action without that action being intentional. It may be
caused by the appropriate mental states—by beliefs and desires that make