Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

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Potential Theistic Explanations 85 by no other agent. First of all, he is assumed to be omniscient. This means that his beliefs simply mirror the way the world is: for any proposition p, “if p, God knows that p.” 21 Secondly, he is assumed to be omnipotent. This means that there are no constraints on how he might realise his intentions, other than those of logical possibility. If a consistent description can be given of an action, then God can perform it. Thirdly, he is thought to be morally perfect. At the very least, I shall argue, this means that God will seek to minimise suffering. So the key question is: What would be the most rational way in which an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect agent could bring about his intended goal? 5.3.1 The Divine Agent Given the nature of the posited divine agent, there are a number of factors that shape human action which we can exclude from the outset. Firstly, it cannot be the case that God acts on the basis of false beliefs or on the basis of unconscious or only partly recognised desires. As an omniscient agent, God has no false beliefs or unrecognised desires. Secondly, it cannot be the case that God is constrained in his choice of means towards an end. As an omnipotent agent, God acts under no constraints, other than that of the logically possible, which is really no constraint at all. Thirdly, God cannot suffer from weakness of will (akrasia). It is inconceivable that he should will an action, but because of his own weakness fail to bring it about. As we have seen (3.4.2), the divine will is unfailingly effi cacious. Fourthly, God cannot be under any compulsion to adopt any means towards an end. He could bring about whatever he wills merely by willing it: if he chose, all of his actions could be basic actions (3.4.2). God could create a world as directly as I move my arm. 22 But if God is morally perfect, has no false beliefs, and suffers no constraints on his action, what follows? On the assumption that he is rational agent we can assume whatever he wills, he would choose the best possible means of achieving it. I shall refer to this as the optimality condition and shall argue that it is the most important constraint on a proposed theistic explanation. 5.3.2 Suboptimality Arguments What the optimality condition offers is something very important: a test of whether a proposed theistic explanation is even a potential explanation of the fact to be explained. The key question is: Given the posited divine goal, is the explanandum the best way in which this goal could be realised? If not, then we cannot plausibly attribute it to God. It is true that I still need to show that we can answer the question. Perhaps there is no “best means” of achieving some goal, or perhaps we cannot know what it is. I shall come to these objections in a moment (5.4). But before I do so, let me spell out my argument a little more clearly.
86 Theism and Explanation If we accept that proposed theistic explanations must meet an optimality condition, it offers us a way of assessing their explanatory force. Strictly speaking, it is not the explanans but the explanandum that must meet this condition. Given a posited divine intention, the explanandum must be the best way in which this intention could have been achieved. If it is not, then positing this intention simply fails to explain, for the explanandum is not what a theistic hypothesis would predict. In these circumstances, the proposed theistic explanation is not even a potential explanation of the fact in question, since it fails to satisfy the second premise of Peirce’s abductive schema (2.1.2). (1) The surprising fact, E, is observed. (2) But if H were true, E would be a matter of course. (3) Hence, there is reason to suspect that H is true. So how might an atheist discredit a proposed theistic explanation? He could do so by arguing that there exists a better way in which God could have achieved his goal. It would follow that the explanandum is a less than optimal means to the posited end, and cannot plausibly be attributed to God. Such suboptimality arguments against proposed theistic explanations are not new. Even in the eighteenth century, David Hume countered the theistic hypothesis by referring to “the inaccurate workmanship of all the springs and principles of the great machinery of nature.” 23 And Charles Darwin supported his theory of evolution by natural selection by reference to the phenomenon of “rudimentary, atrophied, or aborted organs.” I have now given the leading facts with respect to rudimentary organs. In refl ecting on them, every one must be struck with astonishment: for the same reasoning power which tells us plainly that most parts and organs are exquisitely adapted for certain purposes, tells us with equal plainness that these rudimentary or atrophied organs are imperfect and useless. 24 Given the theory of creation, Darwin argues, the existence of such organs represents a “strange diffi culty,” but on his theory it can be accounted for; indeed it “might even have been anticipated.” 25 Following Darwin, such arguments have been common among defenders of evolution, who have argued that “the imperfection of living organisms . . . [does] away with the idea that they were created by an omnipotent and omnibenevolent creator.” 26 Stephen Jay Gould’s “panda’s thumb” argument, which I examined a moment ago (5.2.2), is a product of this same tradition. A more recent example of a suboptimality argument is to be found in a review by A. C. Grayling of a new book on the intelligent design controversy: Your average engineer, tasked with building a human being, would not separate the entrances to the trachea and oesophagus with a movable
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Theism and Explanation
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Theism and Explanation Gregory W. D
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To Anna who never tires of asking
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Acknowledgements My thanks are due
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2 Theism and Explanation Could it m
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6 Theism and Explanation experiment
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8 Theism and Explanation Plantinga
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14 Theism and Explanation explanati
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16 Theism and Explanation God creat
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2 On Explanations in General “Exp
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On Explanations in General 21 of ou
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On Explanations in General 23 merel
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Figure 2.2 Swinburne’s conception
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On Explanations in General 27 simil
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On Explanations in General 29 condi
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3 What are Theistic Explanations? I
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Successful Theistic Explanations 13
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8 Conclusion Miss Binney spoke as i
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Conclusion 145 explanation that met
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Appendix Intentional Explanations M
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Appendix 149 attend any discussion
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Appendix 151 explanation is a causa
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Appendix 153 we assume is a “myth
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Appendix 155 Will this suffi ce as
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Appendix 157 reasoning, Schueler su
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Appendix 159 action, one that has a
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Appendix 161 estimate of her charac
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Appendix 163 causal laws do exist.
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Appendix 165 this is the explanatio
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Notes NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 1. Numbers
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Notes 169 James Maclaurin has remin
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Notes 171 19. Musgrave, “Scientif
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Notes 173 the most explicit in its
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Notes 175 any true proposition, the
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Notes 177 weaker but to their mind
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Notes 179 15. Hume, “Dialogues,
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Notes 181 19. Swinburne, Is There a
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Notes 183 it will also confi rm H 2
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Notes 185 91. I am grateful to Geor
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Notes 187 this be a fatal objection
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Notes 189 71. Lakatos, “Falsifi c
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192 Bibliography Behe, Michael J. D
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194 Bibliography Dembski, William A
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196 Bibliography . A Treatise of Hu
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198 Bibliography Melnyk, Andrew. A
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200 Bibliography Rundle, Bede. 2004
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Index A abduction: and induction, 1
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defences, and theodicies, 134-35 de
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intelligent design theory: argument
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preemption, causal. See causal pree
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tsunami, Boxing Day, 60, 61, 68, 14
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