Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

158 Appendix
Let me illustrate the importance of these distinctions by way of a brief
discussion of “weakness of will,” the problem of akrasia to which Aristotle
refers. 46 If we follow Davidson’s original formulation, and understand
a (fi rst-order) intentional explanation as one that cites an agent’s beliefs
and desires, then weakness of will becomes a problem. For the fact is that
agents do not always act in the way in which it would be reasonable for
them to act, given their beliefs and desires. Yet their “incontinent” actions
(as Davidson calls them 47 ) are still intentional. So if we defi ne an intentional
action is one that is reasonable, given the agent’s beliefs and desires, then
we have lots of counterexamples: intentional actions that are not reasonable,
given the agent’s beliefs and desires.
Let me examine this issue more closely. Taking a slightly different line
from that which I have advocated, Robert Audi has argued that the conclusion
of a practical syllogism is most plausibly regarded as a proposition
about how the agent ought to act, given certain beliefs and desires. It is not
a description of the action itself. 48 Would this solve our diffi culty? No, it
would not. It merely highlights it. For if I suffer from akrasia, then I can
decide how I ought to act and yet fail to act. Let me offer an example.
After careful refl ection, I have decided that animal suffering has ethical
signifi cance and that the commercial production of meat entails signifi cant
animal suffering. As an ethical agent, I want to minimise suffering, and
in the light of these considerations I have decided to embrace vegetarianism.
But faced with the steak option on the restaurant menu, and seeing
the succulent meat being devoured by fellow diners, I can’t resist. I order
and eat the steak. This is surely a case of akrasia; my eating the steak is an
“incontinent” action. The problem is that it is also an intentional act, an act
performed for a reason. But the reason it is performed does not correspond
to the conclusion of a practical syllogism that has my relevant beliefs and
desires as its premises. How can this be?
It is at this point that we require the distinction between a desire and
an intention. An intention, I argued earlier (Appendix 1.2), is an unconditional
judgement that a particular course of action is to be adopted. When
all is going well, an agent’s intention will correspond to the conclusion of a
practical syllogism that has his relevant beliefs and desires as its premises.
One could, in other words, offer a successful “second-order” explanation
of why he formed that particular intention. But in the case of an agent
who suffers from akrasia, these two come apart. The incontinent act is still
an intentional act, one performed for a reason. I order and eat the steak
because I have formed the intention to eat meat, at least on this occasion.
So one could offer a successful “fi rst-order” explanation of why I ate the
steak. The problem is that the formation of this intention was not a rational
act, given my other beliefs and desires.
Weakness of will, on this account, represents a failure to act in an entirely
rational way when forming an intention. So can such action be explained
intentionally? Yes, it can. It can be explained by way of a fi rst-order intentional