Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

Against Religious Explanations 3
contemporary physics will be revised. 14 So a more tenable version of naturalism
might insist that all that exists are the kinds of entities posited by
contemporary physics. 15 What kinds of entities are these? They are, in van
Inwagen’s words, entities having “non-mental, non-teleological, numerical
quantifi able properties” and “composite objects that have these properties
as their ultimate parts.” 16
That’s one defi nition of naturalism. It is, perhaps, a little narrow. There
are many things the existence of which a naturalist might wish to concede
that do not fall into this category. He may, for instance, recognise the existence
of “dreams, joys, plans, aspirations” 17 and other mental states, such
as beliefs and desires. And even if he is sceptical about mental properties,
he may grant some kind of reality to predators, genomes, or infl ation rates,
none of which fall under van Inwagen’s description. 18 So it might be better
to speak of “the existential and causal primacy” of physical properties. 19
What would this primacy entail? There are a number of options here. It
could be argued that there are, in fact, no non-physical properties, or that
such properties exist but are in some sense identical with, supervene on, or
are realised by physical properties. 20 And while van Inwagen’s defi nition
equates naturalism with physicalism, the latter term may be misleading.
Physicalism was originally used of a distinct thesis, namely that “all meaningful
sentences can be translated into sentences of a universal physical language”
21 or—more modestly—that all scientifi c theories could, in principle,
be reduced to those of physics, in the same way as thermodynamics was
reduced to mechanics. I would argue that one can be a naturalist without
accepting either of those theses. 22 Finally, like many such defi nitions, van
Inwagen’s assumes that there is some “fundamental” level of reality? But
what if there is not? What if the world turns out to be “infi nitely decomposable”?
Could one still make sense of the naturalist thesis? 23
These are interesting and important issues, but I shall make no attempt
to address them. The point I wish to make is a more straightforward, less
controversial one. However you defi ne a naturalism of this kind, there is no
doubt that it excludes any reference to a supernatural agent, 24 that is to say,
an agent who is not part of the natural world but who can interact causally
with it. 25 A methodological naturalist will insist that we must proceed as
if there were no supernatural agents, while an ontological naturalist will
insist that there are no such agents. The two are united in their view that,
in the words of Richard Lewontin, “our explanations of material phenomena
exclude any role for supernatural demons, witches, and spirits of every
kind, including any of the various gods from Adonai to Zeus.” 26 It is this
feature of naturalism, and this feature alone, which is the starting point
of my investigation. What interests me is the point made in my opening
remarks, namely that this view is shared by “nearly every present-day scientist,”
27 the only exceptions being those who are professed creationists. 28
The origins of this attitude are a question for the historian. What the philosopher
can ask is: Is it warranted?