Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

180 Notes
43. Ibid., 101.
44. Van Inwagen, “Modal Epistemology,” 70.
45. Ibid., 70, 73.
46. Hume, “Enquiry,” §57 (72).
47 . Ibid.
48. Van Inwagen (“Modal Epistemology,” 71) argues that “there is no such
thing as logical possibility—not, at least, if it really is supposed to be a
species of possibility.” His point seems to be that while we can say when
a state of affairs is logically impossible, it does not follow that what is not
logically impossible belongs to another category, namely that of the logically
possible.
49. Dembski, “Intelligent Design is not Optimal Design,” para. 5.
50. Ibid., para. 9.
51. Ibid., para. 15.
52. Ibid., para. 17.
53. Hume, “Dialogues,” xi (107; emphasis original).
54. Ibid., 103 (emphasis original).
55. Draper, “Pain and Pleasure,” 332.
56. Hume, “Enquiry,” §57 (72).
NOTES TO CHAPTER 6
1. Chap. 5, n. 33.
2. Hume, “Enquiry,” §105 (136).
3. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, a637/b665 (528).
4. Swinburne, Coherence of Theism, 71–73.
5. Swinburne, Existence of God, 6, 328.
6. Ibid., 4. For the sake of consistency, I have slightly altered the layout (but not
the wording) of Swinburne’s sample arguments.
7. Hempel, Aspects of Scientifi c Explanation, 14–20.
8. Swinburne, Existence of God, 4.
9. Mill, “A System of Logic” Bk. 3, Chap. 3, §1 (306).
10. Hempel, Aspects of Scientifi c Explanation, 5.
11. Chalmers, What is This Thing? 13.
12. Mill, “Three Essays,” 447.
13. Dembski, No Free Lunch, 25.
14. Himma, “Application-conditions,” 12.
15. Himma argues (“Application-conditions,” 12–13) that the argument does
not, as it stands, support the conclusion Dembski draws. I am not sure; I
would rather argue that we now have a better explanation of the specifi ed
complexity of biological organisms, namely that offered by Darwin and his
successors. (See my “What is Wrong with Intelligent Design?” 78–80.) Dembski,
of course, denies that evolution by natural selection offers even a potential
explanation of the facts.
16. In his discussion of the design argument in the fi rst edition of The Existence
of God (148), Swinburne claims to be offering an argument from analogy,
which as Mill notes (“Three Essays,” 447) is a weaker kind of argument
than induction. But in the second edition of The Existence of God (168)
Swinburne backs away from this claim. His argument, he now suggests, is
“an argument from evidence that it would be probable would occur if theism
were true, but not otherwise.”
17. Swinburne, Existence of God, 151–52.
18. Ibid., 328.