Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

Successful Theistic Explanations 135
a defence, to use a distinction much favoured by contemporary theistic philosophers.
82 ) Rather, he is suggesting that “for all we know” such scenarios
could be true. In doing this, he is hoping to counter the assessment of relative
probability that forms the basis of Draper’s evidential argument. Van
Inwagen’s “for all we know” scenarios are intended to show that we cannot
safely make that judgement. The procedure here is parallel to that of the
lawyer who offers a series of possible scenarios which would exonerate her
client, not in order to suggest that any of them is true, but in order to suggest
that he cannot safely be convicted. 83
So far, so good. 84 But as van Inwagen recognises, many thinkers will
be unwilling to accept the legitimacy of this strategy. How can he make it
more plausible? He can do so, he argues, by offering a parallel argument, 85
which has to do with a hypothetical ancient Greek atomist. Such a person,
he writes, might be faced with the objection that if air were made of tiny
solid particles, as he asserts, then it “would behave like fi ne dust. It would
eventually settle to the ground and become a mere dusty coating on the
surface of the earth.” 86 But, the objector continues, this does not happen.
It apparently follows that air is probably not made of fi ne particles. The
objection here is parallel to that of the atheist who argues that if theism
were true, we would not expect to observe the distribution of pleasure and
pain that actually exists. It follows, the atheist argues, that theism is probably
not true.
How might the atomist respond? He might do so, van Inwagen argues,
by offering a defence parallel to van Inwagen’s own, that is to say, a scenario
regarding atoms that is true “for all anyone knows.” 87 Here’s one. Atoms,
he might suggest, are (for all we know) covered with invisible long fl exible
spikes, which keep them apart and prevent them falling to the ground. Since
this (or any number of other possible scenarios) might be true, the objector
is in no position to judge what would occur if the atomic hypothesis were
correct. It follows that the atomist’s belief is undefeated.
This is an interesting argument, in a number of ways. Van Inwagen’s
argument assumes that we already have reason to regard theism as true,
irrespective of its explanatory force. As I have already noted, he rejects
what we might call an “evidentialist” defence of Christian faith. But I shall
suppose for a moment that this underlying assumption is wrong, that theism
must prove itself as a hypothesis, having some explanatory force. It is
not just atheists who believe this to be true; there are theistic philosophers,
such as Richard Swinburne, who hold to an evidentialist view. The evidentialist
assumption also underlies Paul Draper’s argument, to which van
Inwagen is responding.
So let’s assume, for the sake of the argument, that the theist is offering his
belief in God as an explanatory hypothesis. In these circumstances, he could
offer a defence against Draper’s evidential argument: a possible scenario that
would account for the existence of evil. This would, as van Inwagen himself
notes, function as an auxiliary hypothesis, allowing the theist to explain an