Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

Notes 171
19. Musgrave, “Scientifi c Realism,” 5; Bartley, The Retreat to Commitment,
262–63.
20. Swinburne, Existence of God, 341–42.
21. Ibid., 341.
22. Swinburne (Epistemic Justifi cation, 62) argues that in the case of inductive
probability, no precise fi gures can be assigned.
23. Swinburne, Epistemic Justifi cation, 56–57.
24. Swinburne, Existence of God, 14; Epistemic Justifi cation, 57.
25. Swinburne, Epistemic Justifi cation, 62.
26. Ibid., 70.
27. Ibid., 64.
28. Salmon, Foundations of Scientifi c Inference, 64.
29. Swinburne, Epistemic Justifi cation, 67–68, 69.
30. Ibid., 70.
31. McGrew, “Review,” para. 7.
32. Swinburne, Existence of God, 52–61; Epistemic Justifi cation, 80–83.
33. Popper, Logic of Scientifi c Discovery, §80 (254). And assuming we can make
sense of the idea of the probability of a hypothesis, Popper notes that its
probability would decrease as it became more testable (Logic of Scientifi c
Discovery, §34 [102–3], §83 [268–73]). So if what we are interested in is
whether a hypothesis has been corroborated (7.1), assessments of its degree
of “probability” would be—on Popper’s view—merely a distraction.
34. Sobel, “Probabilities, Subjective and Objective,” 6–7.
35. McGrew’s objection is particularly interesting. Taking as an example Ptolemaic
astronomy, Swinburne (Epistemic Justifi cation, 73) argues that if our
measure is that of epistemic probability, then the ancient Greeks may have been
justifi ed in holding to the Ptolemaic view of the cosmos. But by the standards of
logical probability, they were not justifi ed in so doing. For although they were
reasoning correctly in adopting that view, they did not realise that there existed
a better hypothesis. But as McGrew notes (“Review,” para. 9), this “appears
to entail fairly sweeping skepticism regarding the logical probability of just
about everything,” since for almost any theory for which we have “epistemic”
justifi cation, there may (and probably does) exist a better hypothesis.
36. Musgrave, Essays on Realism, 223 n. 226.
37. This assumes a distinction between acceptance and belief, similar to that
defended by L. Jonathan Cohen (“Belief and Acceptance,” 368; An Essay on
Belief and Acceptance, 1–16). I shall return to this point shortly (3.1.2).
38. Gale, Evolution Without Evidence, Appendix (166).
39. Earman, Bayes or Bust?, 101.
40. Gale, Evolution Without Evidence, 140.
41. Ibid., 204.
42. Kitcher, Abusing Science, 52.
43. Quine, “Naturalism,” 275.
44. Lehrer, “Justifi cation, Explanation, and Induction,” 100. William Lycan
(“Explanation and Epistemology,” 417) suggests that the term was fi rst used
by James Cornman in 1980, but Lehrer’s paper is ten years earlier.
45. Lycan, “Explanation and Epistemology,” 417. Lycan refers to this as “sturdy
explanationism.” A very similar position is defended by Larry Laudan (“How
About Bust?” 306–8).
46. Swinburne, Existence of God, 48.
47. “Any sentence which is entailed by an observation report is confi rmed by it”
(Hempel, Aspects of Scientifi c Explanation, 31).
48. Salmon, Foundations of Scientifi c Inference, 16.
49. Ibid., 117.
50. Draper, “God, Science, and Naturalism,” 297.