Theism and Explanation - Appeared-to-Blogly

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On Explanations in General 31 could appeal to such an agent be explanatory? I shall argue that it could (in principle), if it employs the rationality principle that lies at the heart of all intentional explanations. Chapter 5 takes us into the heart of my discussion. It addresses the issue of what would constitute a potential theistic explanation. A key requirement it that the theistic hypothesis ought to have independently specifi able consequences. If we attribute to God a particular intention, we need to be able to specify how he is likely to act in order to achieve his goals. And we need to be able to do this without drawing on our knowledge of what is actually the case. If we cannot do this, then any proposed theistic explanation will be without content. Once again, the rationality principle offers the theist a way ahead. But it has a fl ip side. When applied to an agent who is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect, the rationality principle entails what I shall call an “optimality condition.” We will be warranted in regarding a proposed theistic explanation as a potential explanation of any fact only if we cannot conceive of any better way in which that divine intention could have been realised. And whatever else “better” may mean in this context, it surely means “entailing less suffering.” Chapters 6 and 7 apply to proposed theistic explanations the procedure known as “inference to the best explanation.” If we assume, for the sake of the argument, that an account of divine action is a potential explanation of some fact, then how could one show that we have suffi cient reason to accept it? Under what conditions should we regard it as the actual explanation of the fact in question. It is here that I discuss the explanatory virtues against which the adequacy of a proposed explanation can be measured. These virtues will include its degree of testability, its coherence with the rest of our knowledge, the previous success of the research tradition to which it belongs, and whether it enjoys the features of simplicity, ontological economy, and informativeness. The issue is complicated, in this case, by the fact that a proposed theistic explanation is often the only explanation on offer: sometimes there are no competing natural hypotheses. Given that most commentators regard testability as a key explanatory virtue, we need to ask: Can a solitary potential explanation be tested? I shall argue that it can, and that it can be judged by the same criteria as are used for the assessment of competing theories. If we do apply these criteria, we fi nd that a proposed theistic explanation will inevitably score poorly. Other things being equal, we will have good reason to prefer a non-theistic, natural account, if one is available, or to seek one, if it is not. Nonetheless, a proposed theistic explanation might still have some degree of explanatory force. In the absence of a natural explanation we could, conceivably, have reason to accept it. But given its inherent limitations, a proposed theistic explanation would always be an explanation of last resort. 50 The Appendix defends the view of intentional explanations I have presented in the body of the work. Since none of this material relates specifi cally
32 Theism and Explanation to theistic explanations, I have chosen to deal with it separately. Here I shall expand on my view that an intentional explanation can be thought of as a practical syllogism and that it relies on a presumption of rationality. I shall also discuss how an intentional explanation might be tested. I shall argue that, although they suffer from a certain lack of precision, intentional explanations are no less testable than the non-intentional explanations employed in the sciences.
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90 Theism and Explanation directly,
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98 Theism and Explanation (2.1.2) t
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6 Inference to the Best Explanation
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Inference to the Best Explanation 1
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7 Successful Theistic Explanations
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Successful Theistic Explanations 11
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8 Conclusion Miss Binney spoke as i
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Conclusion 145 explanation that met
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Appendix Intentional Explanations M
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Appendix 149 attend any discussion
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Appendix 151 explanation is a causa
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Appendix 153 we assume is a “myth
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Appendix 155 Will this suffi ce as
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Appendix 157 reasoning, Schueler su
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Appendix 159 action, one that has a
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Appendix 161 estimate of her charac
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Appendix 163 causal laws do exist.
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Appendix 165 this is the explanatio
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Notes NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 1. Numbers
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Notes 169 James Maclaurin has remin
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Notes 171 19. Musgrave, “Scientif
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Notes 173 the most explicit in its
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Notes 175 any true proposition, the
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Notes 177 weaker but to their mind
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Notes 179 15. Hume, “Dialogues,
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Notes 181 19. Swinburne, Is There a
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Notes 183 it will also confi rm H 2
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Notes 185 91. I am grateful to Geor
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Notes 187 this be a fatal objection
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Notes 189 71. Lakatos, “Falsifi c
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192 Bibliography Behe, Michael J. D
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194 Bibliography Dembski, William A
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196 Bibliography . A Treatise of Hu
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198 Bibliography Melnyk, Andrew. A
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200 Bibliography Rundle, Bede. 2004
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Index A abduction: and induction, 1
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defences, and theodicies, 134-35 de
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intelligent design theory: argument
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preemption, causal. See causal pree
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tsunami, Boxing Day, 60, 61, 68, 14
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